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INTRODUCTION
Montana lacks any meaningful or enforceable conflict of
interest

statute

controlling

sector employees.

elected officials

and public

The press serves as the only de facto

interpreter of questions and enforcer of ethics violations.
A few recent newspaper articles illustrate this point.

During

the summer of 1992 the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks
(FWP) and State Representative Ed Grady negotiated a hunting
easement on property owned by Representative Grady.^
fall of

In the

1992 after State Representative Dorothy Bradley's

gubernatorial defeat, she and her running mate State Senator
Mike Halligan accepted a free train ride from the Burlington
Northern Railroad on one of their specially equipped railroad
cars.

Following

the same election,

supporters

of

Public

Service Commissioner-elect Bob Rowe organized a fundraiser to
retire his campaign debt by inviting representatives of PSCregulated utilities.

During the 1993 legislative session,

immediately following his tenure as director of the Department
of Health and Environmental Sciences

(DHES), Dennis Iverson

(an ex-legislator) worked as a lobbyist for a cement company

^Representative Ed Grady has been negotiating with the
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks to enter into a
conservation agreement for the preservation of wildlife
located on his ranch.
This agreement would pay Rep. Grady
over $300,000 during a five year period to permit hunting
access on his ranch (an activity he already permits).
Questions have arisen as to the propriety of this agreement in
light of the fact that Rep. Grady serves on both the Fish and
Game, and appropriations subcommittee that oversees the budget
for FWP.
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seeking to defeat legislation that would control the burning
of hazardous waste at
Commissioner

Danny

Attorney General

as

cement plants.

Oberg

sought

In April

clarification

to the propriety

1993

PSC

from

the

for

the

of working

Burlington Northern Railroad for a day to qualify for early
retirement benefits.

He had been on leave of absence from the

BN during his tenure as commissioner.
These instances illustrate that there is no satisfactory
mechanism for the review or determination of the propriety of
such activities.

These situations also demonstrate a major

deficiency in the operations of Montana's government, namely
Montana lacks any meaningful conflict of interest laws.

This

is the subject matter of this professional paper.
The problem with the present situation is that decisions
concerning what constitutes acceptable behaviors are initially
determined by the actors.

They are guided only by their

personal moral judgment, which may deviate from what society
considers proper behavior.

The press then plays its role of

interpreter and enforcer of ethics considerations by writing
a story or editorial on the matter.

If an article appears

raising the issue of impropriety of a public official, then
that person immediately faces potential public ridicule and
must explain his or her position in the public forum.
case everyone loses.

In this

Some may argue that only the press can

deter conflicts of interest through their exposure. However,
the press can not invoke penalties against public officials.
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The press may play the role of the deterrent, but they cannot
act as the enforcer.
If some entity issued advisory opinions prior to the
action, then the public official would have some protection
from public ridicule and the public could be protected from
the bad ethical judgments of its officials.

The opinion would

help to insure that the public official's action is consistent
with the state's best interest.

While this would not stop all

improprieties, it would reduce the likelihood of the problem.
If a conflict of interest violation occurs, then there
should be

some method of

criminal prosecution.

enforcing

ethics

laws

short

of

Under the present system, a press story

about an alleged conflict of interest will not for certain
stop the official from continuing the activity.

The story can

only bring some compliance through public shame and ridicule.
Clearly we are all

losers under our present

system.

Questions of impropriety by a public official erode public
confidence in government and raise doubts about the integrity
of the institution.^

"Great danger looms:

'For as public

officials continue to betray the public trust, the erosion of
democracy necessary follows.'"^
This
conflict

paper
of

argues

interest

that

Montana

statute

^Bob Gerwitt, "Deadly
Governing. June 1991 at 26.

Sins

to

needs

implement

& Wounded

a

meaningful

the

Montana

Legislatures,"

^Robert Bauer, "Law and Ethics in Political
Journal of Law and Politics. (Spring 93): 461.
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Constitution's mandate to preclude conflicts between public
duty and private interest.

The paper begins by tracing the

history of the conflict of interest laws in Montana.
reviews

current

literature

regarding

It then

implementing

and

enforcing effective conflict of interest laws and some leading
states'
problems.

approaches
Finally,

to

controlling

conflict

of

drawing upon this material,

interest
the paper

suggests legislation to establish effective and enforceable
conflict of interest laws in Montana and makes suggestions for
the passage of the legislation.
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PART I.
BACKGROtlND OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS IN MONTANA
Conflict of interest laws are not new in Montana.
laws date back to 1889.

In 1972 the new Montana Constitution

called for a code of ethics

to prohibit

public duty and private interest.
Code

of

However,
offer

Act

to

meet

conflict between

The legislature enacted the

the

constitutional

mandate.

neither this act nor the constitutional provision

enforcement

interest.
of

Ethics

Such

provisions

which

mitigate

conflicts

of

Therefore, it is appropriate to review the history

conflict

of

interest

statutes

and

rules

and

their

interpretation to explain why there has been a failure in
Montana to have meaningful control over conflicts of interest.
In reviewing conflict of interest laws, it is necessary
to understand the concept and its origins.

The

idea of

conflict of interest has its roots in the early writings of
western society.
two masters,"

The biblical expression, "No man can serve

perhaps best demonstrates such origins.

Black's Law Dictionary defines conflict of interest as,
"a clash between public interest and the private pecuniary
interest of the individual

concerned.

Courts

that have

dealt with this matter have expressed the idea as follows:
"The conflict of interest theory is based . . .

on the fact

that an individual occupying a public position uses the trust

^Black's Law Dictionary. 5th ed. (1979) at 271
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imposed in him and the position he occupies to further his own
personal gain.

It is the influence he exerts in his official

position to gain personally in spite of his official trust
which is the evil the law seeks to eradicate.

"A 'conflict

of interest' may be defined as any circumstance in which the
personal interest of a public official in a matter before him
in his official capacity may prevent or appear to prevent him
from making an unbiased decision with respect to a matter.
The 1889 Montana Constitution addressed a conflict of
interest in Article V, Section 30.

The section prohibited

very limited forms of conflict of interest

The focus of the

prohibition centered on a public official's private interest
in public contracts.
The Montana legislature in the early days of statehood
enacted laws that prohibited personal gain from positions of
power.

The laws, however, were limited in scope to conflict

^Coral Gables v. Weskler. 164 So.2nd 260, 263 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1964).
Fighting
Conflicts
of
Interest
in
Officialdom:
Constitutional and Practical Guidelines for State Financial
Disclosure Laws," 73 Mich. L. Rev. 758 (1975).
^Mont. Const, of 1889, Art. V, § 30.
"All stationery,
printing, paper, fuel and lights used in the legislative and
other departments of government, shall be furnished, and the
printing, and binding and distribution of the laws, journals,
and department reports and other printing and binding, and the
repairing and furnishing the halls and rooms used for the
meeting of the legislative assembly, and its committees shall
be performed under contract, to be given to the lowest
responsible bidder below such maximum price and under such
regulations as may be prescribed by law. No member or officer
of any department of government shall be in any way interested
in any such contracts; . . . "
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of interests involving contracts :
"Members of the legislative assembly,
state,
county, city, town, or township officers, must not
be interested in any contract made by them in their
official capacity or by any body or board of which
they are members."*
The legislature also adopted miscellaneous conflict of
interest

laws,

such as anti-nepotism laws

to prohibit

an

official from hiring his family,® statutes prohibiting county
commissioners from entering into private contacts with their
county,

and a prohibition of land board members from holding

an interest in a state lands lease.“

Between the time of

the enactment of these statutes and the adoption of the 1972
Montana Constitution,

only one Montana Supreme Court case

arose involving the enforcement of the contract conflict of
interest laws.

The nepotism statutes resulted in only two

cases in the Montana Supreme Court during this p e r i o d . T h i s
paucity

of

cases

suggests

that

either

there

was

little

enforcement of these statutes or there was never a challenge
to

the

proceedings.

In

Convention dealt with the

1972

the Montana

issue of

Constitutional

conflict

of

interest.

'Political Codes of Montana, § 1023 (1895).
®1933 Mont. Laws, Ch. 12.
^°See Mont. Code Ann. § 7-5-2106.
“See Mont. Code Ann. § 77-1-113.
“Gradv

V.

Livingston. 115 Mont. 47, 141 P.2d 346 (1943).

“Hoaaland V. School District. 116 Mont. 608, 151 P.2d 168
(1944); Kurth v. Grinde. 96 Mont. 608, 32 P.2d 15 (1934).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

8

Instead of taking a specific approach, the delegates took a
more general approach.

Initially, Delegate Aronow introduced

language which prohibited conflict of interest in government
contracts.

His language read similar to the above mentioned

statute :
"No member or officer of any department of the
government shall be in any way interested in any
contract with the state or any of its agencies or
departments."
In the debate on the matter it became clear that the
language did not meet the desired effect of establishing "a
policy and standard of honesty and fair dealing on the part of
officers and employees of state government."*^

The debate

indicated that there were many conflict situations that the
provision did not
introduced

a

contemplate.

substitute

motion

Delegate

Vermillion

containing

the

then

following

language :
"A code of ethics for all state officials,
officers,
legislators
and
state
employees
prohibiting conflict between public duty and
private interest shall be described by law.
This language was later adjusted during the style and
drafting part of the constitutional convention to read in its
present form found at Article XIII, Section 4.

Code of ethics.

The legislature shall provide a

*'*Mont.

Const. Con. 1972,

Trans. Vol. IV at 793.

*^ont.

Const. Con. 1972,

Trans. Vol. IV at 793.

*^ont.

Const. Con. 1972,

Trans. Vol. IV at 79 6.
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code of ethics prohibiting conflict between public
duty and private interest for members of the
legislature and all state and local officers and
employees.
In describing the purpose of the provision Delegate Vermillion
said:
"I think Mr. Aronow has brought up a very important
area here, the conflict of interest; but as you can
see from the questions that have been raised
tonight that it is a difficult area to deal with in
a constitution. . . . The 1989 Constitution has
several sections on it and I think perhaps this
broad area in the proposed section might mandate
the Legislature to have conflict of interest laws
but that for us to spell them out here might prove
to be a difficult task.
But if we do mandate, we
do ask the Legislature to have conflict of interest
laws, as in the case of Florida, I think that the
Legislature would see fit to follow up on this and
give us some good, workable laws to take care of
some of the problems that Mr. Aronow has pointed
out, and some of the other delegates here have
pointed out. Conflict of interest is an important
area; it's a problem that has been developed and
[sic] think with this section that I propose, we
would not find ourselves getting into an area of
problem,
but
instead
leave
it
up to
the
Legislature.
What

is

most

revealing

about

Delegate

Vermillion's

comments is his recognition of the difficulty of the subject
matter.

It may not be

interest

when

it

hard to recognize

occurs,

but

it

is

hard

a conflict
to

of

establish

provisions to prohibit it.
The Constitution was approved by the voters in June of
1972, but it took five years before the legislature finally
implemented the code of ethics.

After three

legislative

sessions the forty-fifth legislative assembly finally dealt
^■’’
Mont. Const. Con. 1972, Trans. Vol. IV at 796.
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with the matter.
Constitution

This was perhaps the last item in the 19 72

that

the

legislature

implemented.

The

19 77

legislature passed HB 462 which established

"The code of

ethics

conflicts

for elected officials

interest."

However,

despite

and prohibited
the

enactment

of

a code

of
of

ethics, the legislature failed to establish any enforcement
mechanism.

The original form of the bill, which contained

enforcement procedures, failed on second reading in the House
on a 46-48 vote.

"After the bill failed to pass the House, it

was sent back to committee.

Almost all of its teeth were

pulled, including the entire section dealing with enforcement.
This hollow shell of HB 462 then strongly passed the House
(76-19) ."1*
The

legislature

recognized

the

difficulties

in

establishing the code of ethics in the statute's statement of
purpose :
Statement of purpose. The purpose of this part is
to set forth a code of ethics between public duty
and
private
interest
as
required
by
the
constitution of Montana.
This code recognizes
distinctions between legislators, other officers
and employees of state government, and officers and
employees of local government and prescribes some
standards of conduct common to all categories and
some standards of conduct adapted to each category.
The provisions of this part recognize that some
actions are conflicts per se between public duty
and private interest while other actions may or may
not pose
such conflicts
depending upon
the
surrounding circumstances.^®

^‘'"Common Cause of Montana Special Bulletin," 1977.
^®See Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-101.
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The legislature laid down some general principles and
rules for conduct to avoid conflict of interest situations.
The legislature then added the limited enforcement section
that gave the Secretary of State the authority to:
advisory

opinions,

(2)

keep

and

permit

(1) issue

public

access

to

voluntary disclosure statements and (3) "make rules for the
conduct

of

his

affairs

under

this

part."

As

with

the

constitution, the legislature delegated its decision-making to
some other entity.

It appeared the task was too politically

difficult for legislators to reach a consensus on what would
or would not constitute a conflict of interest.

Therefore, it

would be the duty of the Secretary of State to decide what
comprises conflict of interest in the specific case, with no
means to enforce violations of conflict of interest.
Within a few months after the passage of the legislation,
the Secretary of State's office received its first request for
determining
situation.

the

proper

course

of

action

in

a

conflict

The Missoula County Attorney asked for an opinion

regarding several conflict of interest situations involving
county officials.

(One of those conflicts involved Missoula

County Commissioner, Jim Waltermire.) The

Secretary of State

did the easy thing; he bucked the question to the Attorney
General

for his opinion.

In 37 Op.

Attorney General determined the matter.

Att'y Gen.

104,

the

During the remaining

years of Secretary of State Frank Murray's term of office, he
20

See Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-132.
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issued no advisory opinions.

All conflict of interest matters

were handled in opinions issued by the Attorney General upon
direct requests of county attorneys
In 1979 the legislature attempted to clarify the 1977 act
by strengthening the provisions in Title 2, Part 2.
bills

met

resounding

RepresentativesIn

defeat

in

the

Montana

These

House

of

1981 another bill to strengthen and

clarify ethics provisions met its demise in the H o u s e . T h e
1981 Legislature did, however, pass Senate Joint Resolution 36
which

called

for an

interim

legislative

committee

to be

assigned the task of studying the code of ethics for the
purpose

of

making

improvements

to

the

statutes

Unfortunately the resolution failed to achieve a high enough
level

of priority

to

result

in an

interim

study.

The

resolution once again identified the problem, but no action
was taken.
Meanwhile,

Jim Waltermire

Secretary of State.

succeeded

Frank Murray

as

In his first opportunity to address the

^^38 Op. Att'y Gen. 55, 79, 103 (1979-1980).
^^Montana House Journal, 432, 970 (1979).
^^ontana House Journal, 290 (1981).
^ont. Sess. Laws, Vol. II, 1577.
^At the end of each session the legislature rates the
proposed study resolutions in priority order.
Only the top
few topics are assigned interim study status. The rest of the
resolution studies are deposited in the files, usually never
to be heard of again.
26

See appendix for copy of resolution.
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issue,

Waltermire declined

opinion.

This

opinion was

Representative McBride(D)

to

issue

sought

an

official

by Senator

advisory

Eck(D)

and

regarding the conduct of Senator

Anderson(R). The requested opinion was charged with politics
and met with a political result.

The Great Falls Tribune

reported the matter this way:
Waltermire last week declined to review the conduct
of Sen. Mike Anderson, R-Belgrade, who earlier this
year reminded his Republican colleagues that the
insurance industry has been a generous contributor
to GOP legislative campaigns.
At the time,
Anderson - who is an insurance agent - was trying
unsuccessfully to
legalize the sale of
life
insurance policies that are invested
in common
stocks. . . .
Waltermire, in
the code gave
actions of a
questions about

the
first ruling of its kind said
him no power to review the
past
legislator but only to answer
prospective future actions. . . .

Eck and McBride responded to that ruling Tuesday by
introducing
a
resolution
saying
Waltermire's
opinion "demonstrated deficiencies in the current
Code of Ethics and (has) raised questions of
interpretation, administration and enforcement.^^
This incident resulted in the introduction and passage of the
before-mentioned Senate Resolution 36.
Shortly after the 1981 session ended. Secretary of State
Waltermire proposed rules pursuant to §2-2-132, Montana Code
Annotated to implement the Code of Ethics Act.

In June 19 81,

a hearing was held to consider the proposed rules.

Seven

people testified at the hearing with only one person (counsel
to the Secretary of State) speaking in support of the rules.

27,

Great Falls Tribune. April 22, 1981 at 9-D.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14

The group of opponents included: the League of Women Voters,
Common Cause, the Montana Democratic Party, Montana AFL-CIO
and

other

individualsThe

general

consensus

of

the

opponents was the belief that the rules failed to deal with
ethics violations.

Representative McBride

opposition's position by saying:

summed up

"If the interpretation

the
of

the statute by the Secretary of State is to be so narrow and
restrictive as to render this statutory provision meaningless
in my judgment, then the public may be justified in asking if
the

Secretary

of

State

is

attempting

to

avoid

his

respons ibility
Waltermire decided not to adopt the proposed rules but
instead sought an Attorney General's Opinion regarding his
authority to adopt the rules.

In a tersely worded letter he

asked for an opinion from the Democratic Attorney General Mike
Greely.

The letter started out by saying,

"I'm tired of

Montana's Code of Ethics being used as a political ploy.. . .
The kinds of shallow accusations that have been coming from
the Democrat's Executive Secretary do a great disservice to
the cause of improved ethics administration in this state.
This concerns me very much because I am committed to a strong

^*Admin. Ethics Rules Hearing, Testimony sign-in sheet,
June 17, 1981.
^’Letter from Kathleen McBride to Jim Waltermire (June 17,
1981).
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workable ethics code for all Montanans."^®

He then went on to

ask the Attorney General's opinion on nine principal questions
and thirty-six sub-issues.
Waltermire

received an Attorney General's Opinion

in

reply which held:
1.
The Secretary of State is required to issue
advisory
opinions,
permit
public
access
to
voluntary disclosure statements, and adopt rules
concerning the conduct of his affairs pursuant to
the provisions of the Montana Code of Ethics.
2.
The Secretary of State is required to issue
advisory opinions concerning the ethical conduct of
either the requesting party or a third party.
3. The method of conducting the Secretary's duties
under the Code of Ethics is within the discretion
of the Secretary of State.
Not surprisingly the opinion reflected the position of
the opponents at the June 1981 hearing.
faced the task of implementing rules.

Waltermire again

The June rules, which

provided a very narrow role for the Secretary of State in
reviewing ethics violations, now had to be expanded to deal
with an apparently enlarged role for the Secretary of State's
office.
On November 2, 19 81, Waltermire proposed a new set of
rules

which

established

a

six-person

ethics

commission.

This commission would handle all matters of ethics violations

^“Letter from Jim Waltermire to Mike Greely
1981).
^^39 Op. Att'y Gen. 32 (1981) .
^^Mont. Admin. Reg.

(1981), Issue No. 21, 1367.
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and issue advisory o p i n i o n s . T h e s e rules resulted in one
more delegation of the duty of enforcement of conflict of
interest determinations.
reached the forth level:

The chain of delegation had now
Montana Constitution to Legislature

to Secretary of State to Ethics Commission.
Following the notice of the proposed rules, new opponents
emerged to attack Waltermire.

This

time the Legislative

Council's Administrative Code Committee and then House Speaker
Bob

Marks

opponents

(Republican)
joined

the

objected
earlier

to

the

rules.

mentioned

The

new

opponents

in

criticizing Waltermire for proposing rules that went beyond
the legislative intent.

They objected to the delegation of

authority to a commission not identified in the statutes.
The press also became critical of Waltermire's proposed
ethics commission.

They objected to the abdication of the

duty to make a decision regarding ethical matters.

"He can

let the commission render its decisions and then sit back and
say, 'Don't blame me, I didn't have anything to do with that
decision.'"^4
Two memoranda from the Secretary of State's Office legal
^^Rule IV.
Purpose.
(1)
The purpose of the Montana
Ethics Commission is to examine requests for advisory opinions
which are received by the secretary of state and determine if
further consideration of the request is warranted. If so, the
commission will examine the facts known to it or found as a
result of any investigation it may conduct or of any hearing
it may hold, apply the standards established in the Code of
Ethics to those facts, and adopt the advisory opinion to be
issued by the secretary of state.
34

Helena Independent Record. December 14, 1981, Editorial.
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counsel Alan Robertson to Waltermire reveal that the rules
dispute had turned into an intra-party and personal squabble
between Waltermire and Marks.
highly

critical

of

the

Marks had sent two letters

proposed

rules.

memoranda suggested ways to fight Marks.

The

Robertson

Interestingly, the

memos hinted that the basis of the disagreement rested in
dispute over a private land transaction between

Waltermire

and Marks :
The options {of dealing with the criticism of the
rules)
I see are these: First, let the war
continue. . . The second option would be somehow to attempt to
separate the personal business aspects of this
controversy from the political/state government
business aspects.
. . .
The
third
option
would
be
some
kind
of
reconciliation scenario. For example, if you could
work the $30,000 cash deal and make the annual
payment, thus keeping the land, it would be
possible to apologize for any trouble caused and
blame it on financial pressures and go forward in a
positive manner.
I want you to know that I know I'm advising you
only on a political basis. I want you to know that
I do not think you are at fault in your business
transaction.
I certainly don't know enough about
it.
Plus I have complete confidence and trust in
what you're doing. I only mean to point out, as I
did with the Missoula County salary situation, the
potential consequences of actions which may be
taken for personal reasons.
Only you can make
those choices ultimately,
and I'm completely
willing to support and deal with whatever you
decide.
In hindsight, it probably would have been better
not to have gotten involved at all in a deal with
this particular person.

^^emorandum from
(November 29, 1981).

Alan

Robertson

to

Jim
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In December 19 81, Waltermire proceeded to adopt amended
rules that established the ethics commission.^^

He then named

members to the commission and they began reviewing alleged
conflict of interest violations
Shortly after the ethics committee began functioning, a
group of people brought a legal challenge seeking to enjoin
the actions of the ethics commission.
"Opinion

and

Order,"

dated

July

Judge Bennett issued an
9,

1982,

which

found

unconstitutional the statutes that granted the Secretary of
State authority to issue advisory opinions.^*

Judge Bennett,

in a cleverly worded opinion, expressed the entire matter as
follows :
Conceding, for the sake of argument only, that the
legislature intended the opinions called for by
Sections 2-2-132(1) to have something to do with
the code of ethics laid down in the rest of the
statute, one is left to speculate as to whether
these are opinions as to the rules of conduct and
the violation of a fiduciary duty (covered by
Sections 2-2-104, 2-2-111, 2-2-121 and 2-2-125), in
which case they would be legal opinions, or whether
they are opinions having to do with ethical
principles (covered by Sections 2-2-105 and 2-2122) , in which case they would be moral opinions,
not having to do with the legal concept of breach
of public trust.
And it would seem that if the
opinions were legal in nature they would be
trenching on the prerogative, generally considered
up until now to be exclusive, of the attorney
general.
(Section 2-15-501(7) and the common law
^ o n t . Admin. Reg.

(1981), Issue No. 24, 1936.

”The initial members of the commission included:
Jane
Hudson, chairman, Wanda Alsaker, Carrol Graham, Jack E. King,
Franklin Stayaert, and James Vidal.
^^State, ex rel. Spencer et al. v. Jim Waltermire. et al..
First Judicial District, Cause No. 47692 (1982).
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antedating out statehood.)
If, on the other hand,
the opinions were moral in nature it would seem
they would be trenching on the prerogative of the
Pope and other ecclesiastical authority.
It is
difficult to believe that the legislature intended
to establish the Secretary of State as either an
auxiliary attorney general or the state's vicar of
morality, yet those seem to be the two functions
assigned by the section in question.
Nothing,
nothing at all, is provided the hapless Secretary
of State in the way of guidance as to why, what,
when, where or how these opinions are to be
generated.
The mystery created by the cryptic
legislative command is so deep the Secretary was
moved to ask the legal advice of the individual he
apparently was intended to replace, the attorney
general, on not one but nine principal issues and
approximately 3 6 sub-issues before he could proceed
with any confidence to sanitize the body politic.
(July 24, 1981 letter.)
The attorney general
shrewdly limited his answers to three (Opinion 3931, 9/01/81) .
He advised the Secretary had no
choice, he must issue some kind of opinion to
anybody that might ask about anything without
mentioning
anybody's
name.
Whereupon,
the
Secretary provided his own guidance by way of
promulgating an extensive body of law, in the form
of rules, and establishing an advisory commission,
presumably to provide the advice and direction
denied him by the legislature and the attorney
general.
All to the point that no one, however insightful of
legislative
intent,
could
possibly
provide
administrative implementation of the section in
question with any confidence that he was carrying
out the will of either the electorate, expressed in
their approval of the 1972 Montana Constitution, or
of the forty-fifth legislative assembly. By simply
authorizing the Secretary of State to "issue
advisory opinions" the legislature ceded nearly its
entire constitutional obligation and authority to
effectuate a code of ethics to that officer and, we
hope, wished him well
With that opinion the conflict of interest statutes met
a major blow.

39

There now exists little if any enforcement

Ibid., 3, 4.
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capabilities in the code of ethics.

Admittedly, there may be

civil penalties that can be assessed against individuals for
enjoying private benefits through a public position.

But the

remedy would be to return whatever benefit that is received.
Additionally, certain conflicts of interest could give rise to
criminal activities such as bribery,compensation for past
official

behavior,'*^

subject

to

their

gifts

to

public

jurisdiction,*^

or

servants
official

by

persons

misconduct.*^

However, prosecution has rarely occurred and the burden of
proof would make these cases difficult to prove.

In essence

the Montana code of ethics is a dead body of laws.

Only

public shame through the press provides negative sanction for
public officials.
As demonstrated in the development of the code of ethics
laws,

no

one

answering

entity

the

difficult

conflict of interest.
entire

wanted

process,

to

assume

question

of

responsibility
what

constitutes

for
a

The political mess that surrounded the

with

perhaps

the

exception

of

the

constitutional convention, destroyed any chance for meaningful
regulation.

Pervasive throughout the implementation of the

rules were conflicts of personalities, personal agreements,
and political motivations which prevented meeting the public
*®Mont.

Code Ann. § 45-7-101.

*^Mont.

Code Ann. § 45-7-103.

*^Mont.

Code Ann. § 45-7-104.

*^ont.

Code Ann. § 45-7-401.
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duty -- assuming the public duty could be fulfilled in the
first place.
After the Bennett ruling,
introduced.

Two

enforcement

with

Office.'”

measures
the

other legislation has been

called

Commissioner

In 1991 and 1993,

for

placing

of

Campaign

the

ethics

Practices

legislation was introduced to

address the lack-of-enforcement problem.

In 1991, House Bills

632 and 633 failed to make it out of committee.

In 1993,

House Bill 227 passed second reading in the House but was sent
to the appropriations committee for a quiet d e a t h . H o u s e
Bill 94 passed out of committee after extensive revision and
made

its way to the Senate

reading debate.”

for its defeat during second

During debate on House Bill 94, one state

senator expressed his opinion about the need for ethics laws
as follows :

"I resent the implication that we're doing wrong

or that we need this type of legislation.
It remains clear that no one has resolved the problem of

”House Bill 689 (1983);

House Bill 107 (1987).

”Under Montana House of Representative procedures, house
bills that have a fiscal impact can be referred to the
Appropriations Committee for its approval. Sending a bill to
the Appropriations Committee is tantamount to killing the bill
without voting against it.
”House Bill 94 would have tightened restrictions on
conflicts of interest for legislators. The 28-22 majority in
the Senate apparently felt that the laws were not needed
because there was no problem.
^'^The Montana Standard. April 1, 1993 at 12.
Statement
made during 2nd Reading debate by Senator Gary Aklestad (RGalata) on HB 94 (new ethics code for legislators).
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how to get meaningful conflict of interest legislation passed.
It resembles the children's story about,

"Who will bell the

cat?"
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P A R T II.

SURVEY OF LITERATURE AND STATE STATUTES
Molly Ivins,
summed up
interest

a reporter for the Dallas Times Herald,

the attitude
problems

legislature,

as

of

legislators

follows:

"As

about

they

conflict

say

if you can't drink their whiskey,

around

of
the

screw their

women, take their money, and vote against them anyway, you
don't belong in office."^*

While this attitude may explain

legislative

does

confidence

behavior,

it

in government.

little

Therefore,

to

restore

public

it is necessary

to

explore the literature discussing conflict of interest laws to
discover workable solutions.
Part I of this paper identifies the historical context of
the conflict of interest laws in Montana.

It demonstrates why

it has been so difficult to establish enforceable conflict of
interest

statutes.

This

part

surveys

literature

on

the

conflict of interest laws and reviews some of the leading
states'

conflict of interest statutes.

conflict of interest laws in two ways.

This part analyzes
First, it focuses on

the limitations of conflict of interest laws.

It discusses

what can or cannot be accomplished by promulgating these laws.
Second,

it identifies

various

approaches

the components of

taken by

some

the laws and the

leading

states.

These

components include prevention, prohibition, and enforcement.

'‘^Mol ly Ivins,
(1991),

Molly Ivins Can't Sav That.

1.
23
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This part also reviews practical and political problems that
must be overcome for the laws to become effective.

LIMITATIONS IN CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW
In

the

pursuit

of

creating

enforceable

conflict

of

interest laws it remains important to recognize what can and
cannot be accomplished-

First, no set of laws can change the

character of the individuals asked to follow them.

Second,

not all conflict of interest situations can be avoided because
certain features of overly restrictive laws will be ignored.
The

laws must

be balanced and

reasonable

and not

overly

restrictive to be enforceable.
It

would

enforceable
problems.

be

laws

naive
is

the

to

believe

panacea

to

that

the

conflict

passage
of

of

interest

"A common criticism of ethics laws is that one

cannot legislate e t h i c s . L a w s

do not change a person's

character, but they might keep a good person honest.

"We tend

to expect

too much

from laws and demand too little

from

people."^®

The laws themselves cannot supplant the need for

voters to elect good people with reputations for integrity.
Public officials will decline to do what society fails to

'‘Michael Josephs on,
"Ethics Legislation: Problems and
Potential," State Legislatures. July 1989, 30.
^“Michael S. Josephson, "Traversing the Mine Field of
Public Service Ethics," The Journal of State Government 62,
No. 5, 185.
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promote.Therefore,

conflict of interest laws will only

carry as much weight as society gives them.

If the public

fails to elect honest candidates or fails to remove corrupt
officials, these laws will have no effect.

Ultimately, the

integrity of government lies not in having understandable and
enforceable conflict of interest laws, but in having public
officials who do not need those laws imposed against them.
It is perhaps easier to instill proper conduct in elected
officials through having virtuous people in office then by
having enforceable conflict of interest laws.

Those people

can lead by exaimple and discourage unethical behavior among
their colleagues.

"Personal example, however is not enough.

After all, people pass from the scene -- some sooner and some
later.Further,

even the most honest can bend under the

pressures of the office.
who hold elected office,

"The temptations that come to people
particularly in a legislature or

Congress, are far greater and more numerous than most of them
will ever encounter elsewhere.
monopolies,

bail

individuals rich.

out

failure

Their decisions can create
and

make

companies

and

Therefore, even honest officials can be

^^John Feerick, "Do We Really Want Ethical Government?"
New York State Bar Journal. (Jan. 1992): 8-11.
^^Charles E. Roemer, III, "Putting Honesty in Politics,"
Journal of State Government 62, No. 5, 171.
^^Tom Loftus, "The Road to Ethical Legislatures isn't
Paved with Tougher Laws," Governing. (Nov. 1991): 11.
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corrupted without conflict of interest laws.
It remains important to keep a focus on what problem is
being eradicated by conflict of interest laws and how that can
be best

accomplished.

limited

to

their

The

effectiveness

reasonableness.

For

of
the

the
laws

laws

is

to

be

reasonable there must be a balance between overly restrictive
and loose laws.
will

not

be

If the laws are overly restrictive, they

enforced.

If

the

laws

are

too

loopholes could permit unacceptable behavior.

loose,

the

For example,

if the law prohibited a legislator from receiving "anything of
value" from a lobbyist, then technically the act of receiving
a free cup of coffee could violate the act.

A prosecutor

would refuse to prosecute or have a hard time convicting an
elected official for the violation of the law for one cup of
coffee.

Such overly restrictive laws are either ignored or

ridiculed.

Conversely, public scandals can occur even though

the questionable behavior is technically legal.
Unfortunately, it usually takes the public outrage of a
scandal to pass strong conflict of interest legislation.”
"History tells us that unless pressed by the backlash from
scandal,

political

leaders

will

almost

invariably

ignore

^*Karen Hansen, "Walking the Ethical Tightrope," State
Legislatures. (July 1988): 17.
”ln 1991, House Bills 632 and 633 (very restrictive
conflict of interest legislation) died swift deaths in the
House State Administration Committee.
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proposals for ethics reform.

"There is no doubt that some

of the fallout (from a governmental ethics scandal) has been
healthy.

Ethics reforms that were sorely needed but seemed

unattainable gained new life.

However, following a scandal

the legislature often enacts statutes that contain overly
restrictive provisions.^®

In reaction to conflict of interest

scandals, lawmakers have absolutely prohibited decision-makers
from taking "anything of value" from interested persons.

This

prohibition includes anything from vacation trips to cups of
coffee.

South Carolina's Attorney General explained this

interpretation as follows :
Because it was not entirely clear what that meant,
(a thing of value) , many of the lawmakers were
jolted by Attorney General Michael J. Bower's
opinion that the new language prohibits legislators
from receiving any of the gifts and free trips they
had been accustomed to, cups of coffee and exotic
vacations alike. Bowers says he doubts that anyone
will be prosecuted for accepting a free meal, but
he suggests that the law be observed to the
letter.^
These overly restrictive provisions could plant the seeds
for inconsistency in the enforcement of the laws.

On the

other hand, you end up with the type of laws the state of
Montana has on the books if there is no impetus to enact
^®John Feerick,
Id. at 10.

"Do We Really Want Ethical Government?"

^^Bob Gerwitt, "Deadly Stings & Wounded Legislatures,"
Governing. June 1991, 28.
^®Jeffrey L. Katz, "Sipping from the Cup of Corruption,"
Governing. Nov. 1991, 27.
"Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28

meaningful

conflict

of

interest

laws.

As

shown

above,

Montana's laws are nebulous and unenforceable.
If you accept the contention that conflict of interest
laws

must

be

reasonable

(neither

too

stringent

nor

too

lenient), then it follows that not all conflicts of interest
will be prevented.

As long as we have a system that requires

raising funds to get elected,

then we will have inherent

conflicts of interest within the system that "reasonable” laws
do not address.

"The root of much corruption, according to

Robert M. Stern, general counsel of the California Commission
on Campaign Financing, is money and a political system that
requires more and more of it to win and maintain office.
Those who contribute large amounts of money to a candidate
certainly have more influence when the candidate becomes an
elected official.

But "reasonable" laws only set the minimum

acceptable standards for proper conduct of public officials.
"Laws . . . establish standards of behavior that may or may
not correlate with individuals' consciences and do not purport
to establish any more than minimal criteria for behavior.
For example, U.S. Senator Cranston violated no law by
using his influence to assist the major savings and loan
scandle kingpin Mr. Keating (a major contributor to his fund
raisers) .

Yet, the Senate Ethics Committee still condemned

“Karen Hansen,

"Walking the Ethical Tightrope," Id. at

15.
®^Michael Josephson,
Potential," id.

"Ethics Legislation:

Problems and
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his actions.

"'The Committee concluded that while "none of

Senator Cranston's
business]

were

'substantially
action.The

. . - activities

[sic]

concerning

[Keating's

illegal,' he had acted unethically by

linking'

fund-raising

laws can only control

consensus backed violations

and

legislative

clearly defined and

of conflicts of interest;

the

voters must do the rest.
While strong enforceable conflict of interest laws may
offer some deterrent effect, they are not the only deterrent.
The former Speaker of the Wisconsin House of Representatives
expresses his belief that the press serves an important role
in

controlling

legislators'

consequences is the most

behavior:

"Fear

of

the

important deterrent

to unethical

behavior, and fear of the press is paramount.

A watchful,

picky, even vengeful --but consistent--newspaper is better than
legal structures that try to anticipate every possible human
foible or temptation.

The

thud of the newspaper at

the

doorstep should make the politician's heart beat a little
faster.
Another expert on ethics put it this way --

the press,

the public and the opposition party may be perhaps "the most

“Robert Bauer, "Law and Ethics in Political Life:
Considering the Cranston Case," Journal of Law and Ethics.
(Spring 1993): 464.
“Tom Loftus, "The Road to Ethical Legislatures
Paved with Tougher Laws," id.
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effective watchdogs of ethical b e h a v i o r . H o w e v e r , as shown
above there still is a need to establish enforceable conflict
of interest laws to curb the behaviors that erode the public
trust.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS
While there are many features of effective conflict of
interest laws, they generally divide into three categories.
Those

components

include:

prevention,

prohibitions,

and

enforcement.
The

elements

of

prevention

include

disclosure

of

financial interests, gifts, benefits received, and political
contributions.

Additional

preventat ive

advisory opinions and education.

measures

involve

Preventative measures try to

sensitize officials to ethical considerations and remind them
of the possible sanctions for improper behavior.
The prohibition provisions identify and make illegal the
activities which constitute conflicts of interests.

Those

prohibitions focus on the use of one's position for personal
gain during and after the period of service.

Some of the

major prohibited conflicts of interest include:
■

Contracts between the state and state officials or
employees

who

can

personally

benefit

from

the

contract.

64

Karen Hansen,

"Walking the Ethical Tightrope," id. at

17
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■

Exerting

undue

influence

by

virtue

position on behalf of family,
contributors

of

clients,

or receiving payments

one's

political

or gifts

for

actions taken.
■

Nepotism.

■

Representing an individual, for a fee or personal
benefit, before governmental agencies while serving
in public office.

■

Improper

use

of

one's

office

resources

for

campaigning purposes.
■

Using

one's

public

position

for post-employment

opportunities.
In the category of enforcement the statutes generally
provide

for

sanctions.

investigations,

hearing,

prosecution,

and

Because of the political nature of conflict of

interest violations, the structure of an enforcement agency
must often be different from normal executive branch agencies
to prevent abuses in enforcement. Such abuses could include
prosecution of adversaries for political purposes.

Improper

or selective enforcement of conflict of interest laws creates
results as abhorrent as the violations themselves.

"Ethical

standards can be violated not only by those whose conduct
breaks the rules but also by those who interpret and enforce
the rules, if they do so in a way -- and for a motive -- that
violates and undermines the basic purposes those standards are
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supposed to serve."65

Preventative Statutes
As mentioned above,

preventative conflict of interest

statutes are designed to make officials aware of potential
problems.

To that end, disclosure of one's personal financial

interests serves to sensitize office-holders to the presence
of potential conflicts of i n t e r e s t . I t also puts the world
on notice of potential conflicts of interest the office-holder
may have. "This provision allows public review and scrutiny of
the private holdings of public servants to assure that these
holdings do not pose a conflict with respect to the officials'
public responsibilities."®^
However, these disclosures usually are not reviewed by
anyone other than a few investigative reporters®* and those
conducting opposition candidate research.

While most believe

disclosure information is a necessary component of effective
conflict

of

interest

laws,

the

extent

of

its

usefulness

®^Bruce Jennings, "Too Much of a Good Thing?" Journal of
State Government 62, No. 5 (1989): 175.
®®Burke and Benson, "State Ethics Codes, Commissions and
Conflicts," Journal of State Government. 62, No. 5 (1989) :
195 .
®^Mario Cuomo, "Restoring Trust in Government, " Journal of
State Government 62, No. 5 (1989): 177.
®*Burke and Benson,
Conflict," id. at 196.

"State Ethic Codes, Commissions and
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remains unknown/^

Further, there remains a question of the

proper balance between the public's right to know and the
public official's right to privacy.
also

may

have

a

chilling

The disclosure laws

effect

on

participation

in

government; individuals may refuse to sacrifice their privacy
for public service.
State disclosure requirements divide in two ways:
has to file and the information they disclose.

who

The state

statutes range from no disclosure to extensive divulgence.
The amount of information required usually depends upon the
status of the office.

State-wide elected officials typically

must reveal much more financial information and gift receipts
than

lower

level

disclosure

of

officials,

their

officials.

only

the

Montana

business

spouses,

and

requires

interests
their

financial

of

elected

immediate

minor

c h i l d r e n . M o n t a n a ' s disclosure laws ignore top appointed
officials, employees in key decision-making positions, hired
consultants, and candidates for office.
require

the

reporting

of

the

These statutes do not

receipt

of

gifts

or

other

benefits bestowed upon the office holder.
‘^’Ibid.

’“"Fighting Conflicts
of
Interest
in Officialdom:
Constitutional and Practical Guidelines for State Financial
Disclosure Laws,"
73 Mich. L. Rev. 758 (March 1975). Also
see Mont. Const, of 1972, Art. II, § 9 (Right to Know about
Government Operations) and § 10 (Right of Privacy).
’^Id. at 781.
’’Mont. Code Ann.

§ 5-7-213.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34

Montana

law

does

encourage

conflicts of interest/^
suggest

that

the

disclosure is made.

voluntary

However,

questionable

disclosure

of

this provision seems to

action

is

acceptable

if

Michael Josephson, a recognized expert on

ethics laws, expressed his criticism of disclosure laws as
follows :
The non judgmental nature of revelation rules seems
to suggest that all conduct is proper so long as it
is disclosed.
I am uncomfortable, for example,
with the idea that honoraria or loans given to
influential government officials can be considered
proper just because they are reported.
Such
transactions ought to be prohibited.
Contrast
South

Montana

Carolina,'^®

requires

all

economic

interests

to

the

requirement

Texas,and

elected

and

and

key

gifts

of

California,^^

Wisconsin.California
officials
in

excess

to
of

disclose
$50.’”

all

South

Carolina requires disclosure statements from an extensive list

^^ont. Code Ann. § 2-2-131.
’^'‘Michael Josephson,
Potential," id.

"Ethics Legislation:

Problems and

^^California often serves as a model state for other
states in the west. It maintains modern conflict of interest
laws with its latest amendments occurring in 1991.
^®In 1991, South Carolina made major changes
conflict of interest statutes following a scandal.

to

its

^Texas enacted major changes to its conflict of interest
statutes in 1991.
^'Wisconsin has had stringent conflict of interest
statutes for many years and recently tightened them even
further.
79

Cal. Gov't Code §§87202,

87207 and 87501.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35
Of

public officials and employees including hired consultants.

These officials must disclose all economic interests and the
receipt of
family

"anything of value," only excluding gifts from

members.*®

government

Texas

officials

and

requires
top

all

officials

elected
in

the

and

key

political

parties to disclose all economic activities and receipt of
gifts of "anything of value," in excess of $250.*^
requires

elected officials,

Wisconsin

candidates and key government

officials to disclose all economic interests and gifts in
excess of $50 except from family members.*^
The clear trend in the most recent enactments of conflict
of interest laws is to require economic disclosures from all
elected or appointed government officials who make key policy
decisions.

These disclosures usually include the receipt of

gifts from non family members.

While it may be excessive to

require the reporting of every free cup of coffee received
from

a

lobbyist,

there

needs

to

be

an

upgrade

of

the

disclosure requirements in Montana.
The other aspects of preventative laws usually comes in
the form of educational and advisory activities performed by
the agency administering the conflict of interest law.

These

activities include educating those who must file disclosure

*®S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-1110 et seq.
"Tex. Code Ann. Art. 6252-9b.
"Wis. Stat. Ann.

§ 19.43.
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statements on the proper way of accomplishing that task.*^
Education also should include not only information about the
do's and don'ts of the laws but also explanations about the
principles surrounding the concepts of conflict of interest
"People

in

government

could

benefit

greatly

from

the

opportunity for concentrated consideration of ethical problems
they typically encounter,

so they can learn more effective

strategies to perceive and deal with the ethical implications
of their conduct."*^
Equally important to education is the availability of
both published and unpublished advisory opinions on real or
hypothetical conflict of interest matters.®®

These opinions

inform the public and interested parties as to the specific
do's and don'ts and offer an opportunity for individuals to
seek advice before the questionable activities occur.

They

not only can prevent a questionable action from occurring, but
also can save an official from potentially embarrassing afterthe-fact scrutiny by the press.
should

remain

confidential

This unpublished information

unless

the

requestor makes

it

public.

83

S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-320(2).

^ Michael Josephson, "Ethics Legislation:
Potential," id.

Problems and

®^Ibid*®S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-320 (11) .
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Prohibitâtions
Conflict

of

identification

interest

of

prohibitions

activities

which

center

constitute

around

conflicts

between private activities or benefits and public duty.
the

Montana

statutes

cover

most

of

the

the

While

above-identified

activities, they are often written in philosophical and obtuse
language that sounds like biblical d i r e c t i v e s T h e Montana
laws

also

contain

many

gray

areas

which

contain

large

loopholes
Montana prohibits nepotism*’ and contracts between state
officials

and

the

state.’®

There

are

revolving

door

restrictions prohibiting former employees from contracting
with his or her former agency.’* However, the restriction is
only for six months and is limited to matters in which the
employee was directly involved.

This leaves much room for use

of personal contacts and insider information gained through

87"The principles in this section are intended as guides
to conduct and do not constitute violations as such of the
public trust of office or employment in state or local
government." Mont. Code Ann. §2-2-105 (1).
*®Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-112(1) illustrates the looseness
of the statutes. "The principles in this section are intended
only as guides to legislator conduct and do not constitute
violations as such of the public trust of legislative office."
(emphasis added)
®’Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-301, et seq.
’®Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-201, et seq.
This section only
prohibits contracts made by public officials in their official
capacity.
’*Mont. Code Ann.

§ 2-2-201.
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public employmentOther states show more definitive prohibitions.

The

following paragraphs summarize those statutes.

Contracts between state officials or employees and the
state.
This item on its face may be the easiest conflict to
identify.

Obviously public officials can not have an interest

in a contract made by

them in their

official

capacity

However, there may be more than direct contracts that must be
prohibited.
South Carolina prohibits public officials or employees
from having an economic interest in a contract if he or she
has an official function relating to the c o n t r a c t T e x a s
prohibits the leasing of office space or real property between
an elected official and the state.
receipt

of

fees

for

solicitation

It further prohibits the
of

contracts

from

the

state.^

Exerting undue influence by virtue of one's position.
This provision precludes both accepting benefits from an
individual seeking a special favor and using public office to
advance one's economic interests.

The offensive conduct may

’^Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-202.
®^Mont. Code Ann. § 8-13-775.
’'^Tex. Code Ann. Art. 6252-9b §§7C and 8A.
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include anything

from taking bribes

or kickbacks

for the

awarding of contracts, to accepting a cup of coffee from a
lobbyist seeking favorable treatment of certain legislation.’^
While Montana has criminal sanctions against the receipt of
bribes and gifts,’® the present laws only provide a fuzzy
prohibition against other related matters.
South Carolina makes

a direct

and broad prohibition

against such activities:
(A) No public official, public member, or public
employee may knowingly use his official office,
membership, or employment to obtain an economic
interest for himself, a member of his immediate
family, and individual with whom he is associated,
or a business with which he is associated. * * *
(B) No public official, public member, or public
employee may make, or participate in making, or in
any way attempt to use his office, memberships, or
employment to influence a governmental decision in
which he, a member of his immediate family, an
individual with whom he is associated, or a
business with which he is associated has an
economic interest. * * *^
If officials in the course of official duties come across a
conflict of interest situation,

then they are required to

disclose the conflict situation and decline to participate in
the decision-making activity.’*
Another South Carolina statute prohibits legislators from
voting on that portion of an appropriations bill which relates
’®Tom Loftus, "The Road to Ethical
Paved with Tougher Laws," Governing. id.

Legislatures isn't

’®Mont. Code Ann. §§45-7-101 and 45-7-104.
^S.C. Code Ann. §8-13-700.
’*Ibid.
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to an area of government that he has conducted business with
or before which he has

represented

clients.

This would

address the concern that certain legislators employed by or
contracting with state government may be taking advantage of
their position to better fund the agency that employs them.
Likewise, it could prevent lawyer-legislators from using the
budget process to punish or reward governmental agencies that
adjudicated their clients'

administrative contested cases.

This provision affects legislators employed in the public
sector or legislator-lawyers who represent

clients before

administrative agencies.
The South Carolina statutes further prohibit offering
anything of value to influence public decision-making:
(A) A person may not, directly or indirectly, give,
offer, or promise anything of value to a public
official, public member, or public employee with
the intent to: (1) influence the discharge of a
public official's, public member's, or public
employee's official responsibilities; (2) influence
a public official,
public member,
or public
employee to commit, aid in committing, collude in,
or allow fraud on a governmental entity; or (3)
induce a public official, public member, or public
employee to perform or fail to perform an act in
violation
of
the
public
official's,
public
member's,
or
public
employee's
official
responsibilities
Likewise,

a public official could not solicit anything of

value for the above-mentioned purposes.
Older Wisconsin legislation presented a looser approach

”S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-705.
^“®Ibid.
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by not absolutely banning gifts or favors.
prohibitions
likelihood

by

that

requiring

a

value

there would be

an

It tempered the

judgment
improper

as

to

influence

economic gain as a result of the gift or action.

the
or

This would

permit the receipt of a cup of coffee or even a meal from a
lobbyist

trying

to

seek

favorable

treatment

of

certain

legislation:
(2) No state public official may use his or her
public position or office to obtain financial gain
or anything of substantial value for the private
benefit of himself or herself or his or her
immediate family, or for an organization which he
or she is associated.
(3) No person may offer or give to a state public
official, directly or indirectly, and no state
public official may solicit or accept from any
person, directly or indirectly, anything of value
if it could reasonably be expected to influence the
state public official's vote, official actions or
judgment, or could reasonably be considered as a
reward for any official action or inaction on the
part of the state public official. This subsection
does not prohibit a state public official from
engaging in outside employment.
*

*

*

(5) No state public official may use or attempt to
use his public position to influence or gain
unlawful benefits, advantages or privileges for
himself or others.*®^
However, after a recent scandal the Wisconsin legislature
shortened subsections three and five to the following:
(3m) No state public official may accept or retain
any transportation,
lodging,
meals,
food or
beverage, or reimbursement therefor, except in
accordance with section 1956(3)
[relating to
honorariums,
fee
and
expenses
for
speaking
engagements]
^®'Wis. Stat. Ann. § 19.45.
‘“Amended by 1989 Act 338, § 54.
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(5) No State public official may or attempt to use
the public position held by the public official to
influence or gain unlawful benefits, advantages or
privileges personally or for others.
Additionally,

the

Wisconsin

legislature

specifically

prohibited the receipt of tickets or parking privileges for
sporting events.
California prohibits the use of official position for the
purpose of influencing a
any

governmental decision "relating to

person with whom he or she is negotiating,

or hasany

arrangement concerning, prospective employment.

Nepgfigm.
Nepotism

is

defined

as

"the

bestowal

patronage by reason of relationship

of

political

rather than merit.

The Montana statutes in this area are clear and unambiguous.
Section 2-2-302, MCA generally prohibits a public official
from employing family m e m b e r s . A
includes provisions which address

South Carolina statute
other personnel matters

relating to an official's family member if that individual is
already employed before the official assumes office:

^°^Amended by 1991 Act 316, § 182.
*°*Wis. Stat. Ann. §19.451.
^°*Cal. Code Ann

§ 87407 Gov't. Code.

^°^ont- Code Ann. § 2-2-301.
^°^There are some minor exceptions to this prohibition,
such as a sheriff may appoint a family member as a cook or
attendant.
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(A) No public official, public member, or public
employee may cause the employment, appointment,
promotion, transfer, or advancement of a family
member to a state or local office or position in
which the public official, public member, or public
employee supervises or manages.
(B)
A public official, public member, or public
employee may not participate in an action relating
to the discipline of the public official's, public
members's or public employee's family member.^®®
Representing others while serving in public office.
An emerging area in conflict of interest statutes is the
prohibition of public personnel
before

agencies

or

boards.

from representing clients

The

primary

focus

of

this

prohibition is to prevent a public official or his family or
business associates from representing another person before a
governmental

entity.

The

insider

information,

personal

contacts, and influence gained through one's position could
lead

to an unfair

advantage

for

the

client.

This

prohibits state legislators who are attorneys

also

from having

their firms represent clients before state agencies.
Improper use of one's office for campaigning purposes.
One
officials

of
is

the
the

purposes.This

often
use

raised
of

complaints

their

about

elected

for

campaign

offices

concern is not limited to candidates for

^®*S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-750.
S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-740.
llOf

"'George Carinello, "Should Lawyers Be Legislators?"
State Government News. (May 1991): 12. Also see Hastings Law
Journal 41 (1989).
IllSee Missoulian. November 19, 1985 at 11.
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elected office seeking reelection or another office.

It can

also apply to elected officials or public employees who may
have an interest in a ballot measure.

Montana law somewhat

addresses this concern:
No public employee may solicit support for or
opposition
to
any
political
committee,
the
nomination or election of any person to public
office, or the passage of a ballot issue while on
the job or at his place of employment.
However,
nothing in this section is intended to restrict the
right of a public employee to express his personal
political views.
South Carolina specifically prohibits the use of governmental
personnel or facilities for election purposes:

"No person may

use government personnel, equipment, materials, or an office
building in an election campaign.

Using an office for future employment opportunities.
This

area

prohibitions
opportunities

on

of

conflict

the use

after

of

of

interest

public

laws

office

leaving a government

for

deals

with

employment

position.

This

practice (revolving door activities) generated much criticism
of President Reagan's appointees during his administration.
The practice centers around officials either taking advantage
of their position to obtain future employment or using insider
information and personal contacts from their former position
in post-office employment -- such as:

lobbying or appearing

"^Mont. Codes Ann. § 13-35-226(3).
”^S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-770.
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before the agency that had employed that

individual.

By

Executive Order the Clinton administration prohibited former
employees from having any contact with their former agency or
lobby for up to five years.
State governments unfortunately can not draw upon high
salaries

or

restrictions
positions.

prestige

to

overcome

tight

in attracting good candidates

revolving

door

for appointive

"While many states may be criticized for ignoring

the problem of 'revolving doors,' care should be taken not to
draw too strict barriers.

Too tight of a 'revolving door'

provision may make it difficult to recruit administrators.
Montana addresses the revolving door problem only to the
extent it applies to interests in contracts with the state.
Former employees cannot have any contractual ties to the state
for

six months

matters

after

directly

termination

related

to

of

their

their

employment

employment.**®

in

This

approach leaves major revolving door problems that should be
addressed.
Some other state statutes require a one-year waiting
period before having business contacts with the government.
The type of contact with the government that is permitted
depends upon the position and the activities of that position.
**'*Exec. Order No. 12834 (Jan 20, 1993);
(Jan. 22, 1993).

58 Fed. Reg. 13

**^Burke and Benson, "State Ethics Codes, Commissions and
Conflicts," Journal of State Government 62, No. 5 (1989): 197.
**®Mont. Code Ann. § 2-2-201.
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California

specifically precludes

former

legislators

from

lobbying the legislature or representing any other person
before any state agency for the year immediately after leaving
office.

State officers are also prohibited from representing

anyone before a state agency for one year following their
leaving

office.

State

employees

and

consultants

are

prohibited from representing anyone before the agency in which
they were employed."^

A California statute also precludes

having any involvement with a governmental decision pertaining
to

an

entity

employment.”®

with

whom

that

person

is

negotiating

South Carolina prohibits accepting employment

from "a person who is regulated by the agency or department on
which the former public official,
former

public

employee

served

former public member,

or

was

employed,"

if

or
the

employment involves a matter they participated in during their
public service.”®

Enforcement
No matter what conflict of interest laws are enacted,
they are ineffective without a workable enforcement mechanism.
Enforcement needs to occur through an independent agency that
has the ability to fairly and completely administer the laws.
"A second essential is consistent application of the laws . .
”^Cal. Code Ann. § 87406, Gov't Code
”®Cal Code Ann. § 87501, Gov't Code
”®S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-755.
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. . pursued to a guilty or not-guilty conclusion.

Tom

Loftus, the former speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly, came to
that conclusion after following an influence-peddling scandal
which happened in spite of strong state conflict of interest
laws.

Strong laws without proper enforcement result in the

ignoring of the laws.

Therefore, it is necessary to establish

a structure for enforcement that secures the consequences for
violating conflict of interest laws.
As shown above, Montana lacks any enforcement of conflict
of interest laws, with the exception of criminal prosecution
for bribery or official misconduct for receiving gifts from
those whom you regulate.

This enforcement only addresses the

most flagrant of abuses of conflict of interest situations,
and little or no prosecution in this area has occurred.
are no sanctions

short

of severe

There

criminal prosecution to

control a conflict of interest problem.
Generally the states with modern conflict of interest
laws provide for their enforcement though ethics commissions.
In the post-Watergate years of 1974 to 1978, states
rushed to write ethics laws that were mostly
ineffective because there were few,
if any,
enforcement measures included.
But in the past
four years there has been a great deal of
recodification,
tightening
of
loopholes
and
wholesale revisions of some of these laws.*^*
The makeup of the enforcement agency is crucial because
^^om Loftus, "The Road to Ethical Legislatures Isn't
Paved with Tougher Laws," Governing. id.
121,

‘Karen Hansen,

16

"Walking the Ethical Tightrope," id. at

•
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it determines if the state will have "ethical politics" or
"political

ethics.

everyone wins,
everyone

and

loses

"Ethical

politics"

"political ethics"

because

prosecution

is a game

that

is a game in which

of

violations

is

for

political purposes.
There are two approaches
abusive commission.

to avoiding a partisan and

The statutes can either acknowledge the

political sensitivity of the commission and insure a balance
between the major parties or alternatively attempt to sanitize
the

politics

by

selecting

politically

neutral

members.

Illustrative of the former method, the Texas Commission has
eight members with an equal division between the political
p a r t i e s . T h i s division attempts to maintain a balance of
interests between the major parties.
Carolina makes
(subject

to

its governor
legislative

select

Alternatively,
the

confirmation)

South

ethics

commission

from

supposedly

politically neutral people with none of the members having any
ties to government.*^
Derivatives of these formulas could include the methods
used

by

Montana

Commission*^^

or

for

selecting

appointing
the

the

Reapportionment

Commissioner

of

Campaign

*^^Bruce Jennings, "Too Much of a Good Thing, " id.
*^^Tex. Code Ann. § 1.04, Art. 6252-9d.l.
*^S.C. Code Ann. §§ 8-13-310 and 8-13-330.
‘^ o n t . Code Ann. § 5-1-102.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49

Practices

In

the

achieved with one

former,

tie-breaker,

selected by a majority of
latter,

the

political

balance

is

politically neutral member

the partisan members.

In the

the governor selects the Commissioner from a list

submitted by the politically balanced legislative leadership.
Other important features of enforcement are the powers of
the agency to investigate and prosecute conflict of interest
violations.
to

those

Commissions in other states have powers similar
granted

to

state

agencies

Administrative Practices Act (MAPA).*^^

under

the

Montana

Those powers include

administrative searches, subpoenas and authority to conduct
contested cases.

However,

due to the sensitive nature of

these type of complaints, public disclosure of the proceedings
may be limited until the case reaches final disposition.*^*
These cases could be handled the same way the Commission on
Practice presently handles lawyer discipline.
The enforcement agencies generally have the authority to
either impose civil penalties or refer the matter for criminal
prosecution.
restitution

The
of

civil

penalties

inappropriately

removal from office,

used

may
funds,

include

fines,

suspension

revoking lobbying privileges,

*^®Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-102.
*^5ee Mont. Code Ann., Tit- 2, Ch. 4.
*2*s.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-320 (g) .
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cancellation of contracts.*^’
imposed

for

reports.

failing

to

Additionally, sanctions can be

file

timely

financial

disclosure

Some statutes provide for penalties against persons

submitting fraudulent or frivolous claims.
Clearly the capacity to enforce conflict of interest laws
rests greatly upon the quality and integrity of the members of
the enforcement agency.

But no matter how the members are

selected or what the political balance of the commission is,
it is equally important to have an enforcement agency with
members who have solid political moxie and good political
judgment.

"Political judgment, in the classical sense of the

term, is the capacity to tell the difference between public
and private ends.

It is also the ability to spot a private

interest masquerading as a public good.
Finally, there must be a commitment by the legislature to
fully fund the enforcement agency so it can do its job.

The

quality of the conflict of interest laws or of the individuals
serving in the enforcement agency matters little if there is
not

a

real

financial

commitment

by

the

legislature

to

enforcement of the laws.

‘2’See S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-1510; Tex. Code Ann. §1.28,
Art. 6252-9d.l; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 19.53.
*^^is. Stat. Ann. § 19.53.
^^^Bruce Jennings, "Too Much of a Good Thing?" id.
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P A R T III.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Part I discussed the past
interest laws in Montana) .

(history of the conflict of

Part II reviewed the present,

through a survey of literature and statutes.

Part III makes

recommendations for the future of conflict of interest laws in
Montana.

Part III proposes legislation and a strategy for its

passage in Montana.

Attached to this paper is the appendix

containing the proposed legislation.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The Council of State Governments,

through its subgroup

the Council on Governmental Ethics Laws

(COGEL), formed a

committee to draft and recommend model ethics legislation.

It

sought to draft uniform legislation and find ways to deal with
difficult issues (as identified in this paper).

A f t e r

reviewing conflict of interest legislation from other states
it becomes clear that the model legislation prepared by COGEL
offered a composite of the most advantageous features from all
of the states.

The "Model Law for Campaign Finance, Ethics

and Lobbying Regulation" offers a balanced and comprehensive
approach to addressing conflict of interest issues identified
in Part II.

COGEL's membership

includes a geographical

diverse group of people involved with different aspects of
ethics laws.

This group included experts in the fields of

campaign finance,

ethics and lobbying regulation.
51
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council

members

governmental

have

ethics.

experience

in

the

COGEL operates

with

regulation
assistance

of
and

support staff from the Council of State Governments (CSG).
While the model legislation deals with more than conflict
of

interests

issues^^^,

the

"Ethics"

part

that

focuses

on

conflicts of interest makes a suitable starting point for
drafting proposed legislation.
appendix
act.

The legislation found in the

relies heavily on the language found in the model

The proposed legislation deviates from the model act in

areas that require modification for passage and operation in
Montana.
This legislation provides softer prohibitions than the
model legislation.

This makes its passage more likely because

legislators are not

likely to pass

control their own behavior.
receive

minor

gifts,

strict measures which

Specifically, it is acceptable to

meals

and

"anything

of

value"

in

reasonable small monetary values under an aggregate amount of
$500 a year.

Reporting is not necessary for the receipt of

anything of value in an aggregate amount of less than $500 a
year.

This

recognizes

the

difficulty

in

enforcing

prohibitions as stringent as the South Carolina laws.

It

further makes financial discloser requirements apply only to

132
"A Model Law for Campaign Finance, Ethics, and
Lobbying Regulation" contains three integrated parts as
identified in its title. Edward D. Feigenbaum served as chair
of the committee and also edited the campaign finance portion
of the act. John L. Larsen served as the editor of the ethics
part and Betty J. Reynolds edited the lobbying section.
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the upper administration offices and elected officials.
cost

of

administration

information

from

only

is

thus

those

who

reduced
hold

by

The

requiring

positions

that

set

administrative policy.
This legislation substantially modifies the model act's
enforcement

procedures.

legislation

uses

assigning
conflict

an

of

interest

Campaign Practices.

enforcement

existing

the duties
of

The

portion

administrative

agency

investigation and prosecution

violations

to

the

Commissioner

to minimize

passage of

the
by
of
of

This merely expands the duties of that

agency and should result in a minimal fiscal impact.
attempt

of

fiscal

the legislation.

impact

is

important

Legislation that

Every

to secure
includes a

fiscal impact receives very close scrutiny and usually its
passage is unlikely.
The legislation assigns adjudicatory and advisory opinion
functions to an ethics commission.

The legislature would

appoint the membership of the commission in the same manner as
the Legislative Reapportionment Commission.

The separation

of the prosecution from the adjudication would further insure
fair and impartial treatment of the alleged violator. This
would prevent a "star c h a m b e r a t m o s p h e r e ,

133

where the same

See Mont. Code Ann. § 5-1-102.

^^Ancient Britain used a "Star Chamber" to prosecute
individuals.
This procedure lacked major due process
protection because of its structure and treatment of the
defendants.
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agency serves as investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury.
The legislation also contemplates punishing individuals
making false complaints.

Therefore, if an individual tries to

use the enforcement process to falsely accuse somebody, then
they may face a penalty. This should prevent political parties
from using the process for harassment or political purposes.
The accused also has an opportunity to force a show cause
hearing to make the prosecutor prove that enough evidence
exists to continue the proceeding.

This may prevent unfounded

accusations and innuendoes from ruining a person's career.
Because of the sensitive nature of the matter, the accused
would have the option to make the proceedings either open or
closed to the public.

However, the results of the findings

ultimately would become available for public inspection.
Finally,

the

proposed

existing nepotism statutes.

legislation

incorporates

the

The existing Montana statutes

address nepotism issues; however, they permit flexibility for
quirks in the law peculiar to Montana.

For example, under

existing statutes, a sheriff may hire a relative to prepare
meals for prisoners.

This provision addresses the problem of

finding employees in small towns.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PASSAGE
This paper identified the difficulty of gaining passage
of any meaningful conflict of interest legislation.
result

of

the

problem,

someone

must

develop
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through

a

consensus

building

process.

It would

require

bringing all of the interest groups together prior to the
session

to

recommend

legislation.

and

review

conflict

of

interest

Such interest groups would include everyone from

Common Cause to the people subject to the legislation.
The

following

process

would

provide

the

political

groundwork necessary for the passage of the legislation.
The first step begins with building a coalition of interested
parties to participate in the development of the conflict of
interest

legislation.

That

coalition

should

include

representatives from many interest groups including: elected
officials,

public

employees,

lobbyists,

media

reporters,

political party officials, and public interest groups.
This

group

must

first

identify

the

problems

the

legislation should solve and then draft the legislation to
solve those problems. This process would include researching
what

legislative

solutions

are

used

by

other

states

and

reviewing model legislation in order to determine the best
approach

for Montana.

The

group

should

then

legislation deemed appropriate for Montana.

draft

the

The diversity of

the group may make it difficult to reach a consensus as to
what issues need to be addressed and how.
consensus

is

reached

the

participants

However, once the
can

help

sell

the

legislation to their respective groups.

The

legislation

drafting

group

should
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legislation as modified for Montana needs.
laws

as

a

starting point,

the

By using the model

legislature

greater confidence in its contents.

should have

a

It would also insure a

more consistent interpretation by the courts.

The courts then

can use established case law from other states that use the
same

language.

adoption of

This

is

consistent with

"uniform laws"

throughout

the

reasons

the country.

for
The

legislature tends to trust these uniform laws.
Once the legislation is drafted, it should be circulated
to all interested parties for comments and recommendations.
This will help identify the detractors.
drafters

of

the

legislation

can

Additionally,

deflect

the

the

detractors'

criticism by finding ways to incorporate the suggestions or by
being able to respond to objections.

The group should also

lobby the detractors to help them understand why it is in
their interest to support the legislation.

However, if they

can't be converted, then the identification of the opponents
will help in developing a game plan for the passage of the
legislation in spite of their objection.

Further, those who

fail to respond to the request for comments will lose some of
their credibility if they first raise their objections during
the legislative process.
To make the passage of the legislation possible, it is

^^^Many uniform law exist, such as the uniform commercial
code, the Model Business act, the uniform probate code. These
laws are drafted by Uniform Code Commissioners or the American
Bar Association select committees.
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necessary

to

opinion.
support

create

a

give

of

supportive

public

The drafters of the legislation should seek public
for

the

legislation

opinion/editorial pieces.
to

groundswe11

speeches

organizations.

to

through

press

releases

and

They should also seek opportunities

business

or

civic

groups,

clubs

or

The focus should be to educate the public

about conflict of interest problems and then to sell the
proposed

legislation

Throughout

as

the process,

the

solution

to

these

problems.

the drafters should solicit,

from

outside the group, supporters to write letters to the editor
or make comments on call-in radio shows.
The drafters of the legislation should seek to get public
commitments from legislative candidates.

The proposed draft

legislation should be provided to candidates with a request
for their support.

If the legislation is properly drafted,

then it will be difficult for candidates to publicly oppose
the legislation.

If a candidate does oppose or fails to

support this legislation,

then he or she most likely would

receive criticism from the press and the public.

This "on

record" support for the legislation will be necessary to hold
votes

when

legislation.

behind-the-scenes

opponents

seek

to

kill

the

This process will remind legislative candidates

and elected legislators why conflict of interest law reform is
necessary.

Immediately after the election, the drafters should start
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planning how to obtain the passage of the legislation. They
should identify the key legislative
willing to sponsor this legislation.

leaders who would be

Emphasis should be given

to finding both Democrat and Republican leaders from both
houses to sponsor the bill.

The drafters should lobby the

leadership to send the legislation to favorable committees,
or,

at

least,

get

their

commitment

to help marshall

the

legislation through.
It is also necessary to gain support
elected officials.

The

support

of

form top state

the Governor and

the

Attorney General may prove essential for the passage of the
legislation.

The

governor

serves

as

the

leader

political party and the top executive officer.
General,

as

the

top

legal

officer,

promoting proper standards of conduct.

plays

of

one

The Attorney

a key

role

in

Therefore, they both

must sign off on this legislation early in the process and be
committed

to being publicly

identified

as

supporting

the

legislation.
Without

the

presence

of

some

scandal

to

force

the

legislature to make the necessary reform, the likelihood of
success may become problematic.

However, passage is possible

if the proponents of the reform legislation do the necessary
work.

Finally,

should

the

legislation

fail,

then

the

initiative process should be pursued to obtain passage of the
legislation.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it will be difficult to gain passage of
meaningful and enforceable conflict of interest legislation.
Its

passage

officials,

will

but

not

guarantee

proper

a

significant

integrity

in

of public

it should provide appropriate treatment of

those who violate the public trust.
play

conduct

role

government.

in

the
Any

The press will always
process

of

conflict

maintaining
of

interest

legislation must get support from as many sources as possible
to assure passage.
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APPENDIX
A BILL FOR AN ACT ENTITLED AN ACT TO GENERALLY REVISE THE
ETHICS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, AND PERSONAL FINANCE DISCLOSURE
LAWS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, AND REPEALING TITLE 1
CHAPTER 2.

This shall be known as the Ethics, Conflict of Interest,
and Personal Financial Disclosure Act.
§ 1 Intent and Purpose

The purpose of this act is to set forth an enforceable
code of ethics prohibiting conflict between public duty and
private interest as required by the constitution of Montana.
The proper operation of democratic government requires that a
public official or employee be independent and impartial; that
government

policy

and

decisions

be

made

through

the

established processes of government; that a public official or
employee not use public office to obtain private benefits;
that a public official or employee avoid action which creates
the appearance of using public office to obtain benefit; and
that

the public have

confidence

in the

integrity of

its

government and public officials and employees.
§ 2 Definitions

As used in this act,

unless the context

clearly indicates otherwise, the following definitions apply:
(1) "Anything of value" includes the following:
(a) A pecuniary item, including money, or a bank bill or
note.
(b) A promissory note, bill of exchange, order, draft,
60
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warrant, check, or bond given for the payment of money.
(c) A contract, agreement, promise, or other obligation
for

an

advance,

deposit,

conveyance,

distribution,

forgiveness

of

payment,

gift,

loan,

indebtedness,
pledge,

or

transfer of money.
(d) A stock, bond, note, or other investment interest in
an entity.
(e) A receipt given for the payment of money or other
property.
(f) A right in action.
(g) A gift, tangible good, chattel, or an interest in a
gift, tangible good, or chattel.
(h) A loan or forgiveness of indebtedness.
(i) A work of art, antique, or collectible.
(j)

An

automobile

or

other

means

of

personal

real

property,

transportation.
(k)

Real

property

or

an

interest

in

including title to realty, a fee simple or partial interest,
present or future,

contingent or vested within reality,

a

leasehold interest, or other beneficial interest in realty.
(1) An honorarium or compensation for services.
(m) A rebate or discount in the price of anything of
value unless the rebate or discount is made in the ordinary
course of business to a member of the public without regard to
that person's status as a public official or public employee,
or the sale or trade of something for reasonable compensation
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that would ordinarily not be available to a member of the
public.
(n) A promise or offer of employment.
(o)

Any

other thing

of

value

that

is

pecuniary

or

compensatory in value to a person.
(p) The agency may also promulgate rules and regulations
defining additional things of value.
(q)

"Anything of

value "

does

not

mean

a

campaign

contribution properly received and reported, if reportable, as
required under the Campaign Finance Act.
(2)

"Associated,"

when

used

with

reference

to

an

organization, includes an organization in which an individual
or a member of his or her immediate family is a director,
officer,

fiduciary, trustee, agent,

or partner,

controls, in the aggregate, at least

or owns

or

[should range from any

interest at all to two (2) percent or a value of $5,000 or
greater,

in comport with the following definition]

of the

outstanding equity.
(3) "Business associate" includes the following:
(a) An employer.
(b) A general or limited partnership,

or a general or

limited partner within the partnership.
(c) A corporation:
(i)that is family-owned; or
(ii) in which all shares of stock are closely-held;
or the shareholders, owners, or officers of the corporation.
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(d)

A

corporation

in

which

the

public

official

or

employee, or other person subject to the Act:
(i) has an investment interest;
(ii) owns; or
(iii) has a beneficial interest in shares of stock
which constitute more than:
(A)

five percent

(5%)

of

the value

of the

corporation, or
(B) $1,000.
(e)

A

corporation,

business

association,

or

other

business entity in which the public official or employee, or
other person subject to the Act

serves as an agent or a

compensated representative.
(f) An

association

not

otherwise

covered

by

this

definition between the public official or employee, or other
person subject to the Act, and another person, which involves
the conduct of a common enterprise.
(4)

"Candidate" means an individual who seeks nomination

or election to [state] office.

An individual is a candidate

when the individual:
(a) files

a

statement

of

candidacy

or petition

for

nomination for office with the appropriate filing officer;
(b) is nominated for office by:
(i) a party at a primary;
(ii) nominating convention; or
(iii) petition for nomination;
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(c) solicits or receives and retains contributions, makes
expenditures, or gives consent to an individual, organization,
political party, or committee to solicit or receive and retain
contributions or make expenditures to secure nomination or
election to any office at any time, whether or not the office
for which the individual will seek nomination or election is
known when the :
(i) solicitation is made;
(ii) contribution is received and retained; or
(iii) expenditure is made; or
(d) is

an

officeholder

who

is

subject of

a

recall

election.
(5) "Charitable

organization"

means

an

organization

identified in Title 35 Chapter 2 as a public benefit nonprofit
corporation as it currently exists or as it may be amended.
(6) "Compensation" includes:
(1) an advance, conveyance, forgiveness of indebtedness,
deposit,

distribution,

loan,

payment,

gift, pledge,

or

transfer of money or anything of value ; or
(2) a contract, agreement, promise, or other obligation
for

an

deposit,

advance,

conveyance,

distribution,

loan,

forgiveness
payment,

of

indebtedness,

gift,

pledge,

or

transfer of money or anything of value, for services rendered
or to be rendered.
(3) The term does not include reimbursement of expenses
if:
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(a) the reimbursement does not exceed the amount actually
expended for the expenses; and
(b) it is substantiated by an itemization of expenses.
(7) "Consultant" means an individual other than a public
official or public employee who contracts to:
(a) evaluate bids for public contracts; or
(b) award public contracts ;
for the state [or political subdivision].
(8) "Economic Interest" means an interest distinct from
that of the general public in a state purchase, sale, lease,
contract,

option,

or

other

transaction

or

arrangement

involving property or services in which a public official or
public employee may gain an economic benefit of fifty dollars
($50) or more.
(9) "Family member" means an individual:
(a) who is the spouse, parent, sibling, child, mother-inlaw, father-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, grandparent,
or grandchild; or
(b) is a member of the individual's household.
(10) "Filer" means an individual who is:
(a) a public official or who is nominated to be a public
official;
(b) a public employee appointed by a public official;
(c) a candidate under the Campaign Finance Act;
(d) a public member; or
(e) a consultant.
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(11)

(a)

"Gift" means anything

of value

other than a

contribution to a candidate as defined under the Campaign
Finance

Act

in

Section

13-1-101

to

the

extent

consideration of equal or greater value is not received.

that
The

term includes a rebate or discount in the price of anything of
value unless the rebate or discount is made in the ordinary
course of business to a member of the public without regard to
that person's status as a candidate.
(b) The term does not include the following :
(i) Printed informational promotional material.
(ii) A gift that:
(A) is not used; and
(b) no later than thirty (30) days after receipt, is
returned

to

the

donor

or

delivered

to

a

charitable

organization and is not claimed as a charitable contribution
for federal income tax purposes.
(iii) A gift, devise, or inheritance from an individual's
spouse, child, parent, grandparent, brother, sister, parentin-law, brother-in-law,

sister-in-law, nephew, niece, aunt,

uncle, or first cousin or the spouse of that individual, if
the donor is not acting as the agent or intermediary for
someone other than a person covered by this paragraph.
(d) A personalized plaque or trophy with a value that
does not exceed one hundred and fifty dollars ($150).
(e)

Food and beverage

consumed on the occasion when

participation in a charitable, civic, or community event which
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bears

a

relationship

to

the

public

official's

or public

employee's office and the official or employee is attending in
an official capacity.
(12)
residing

"Immediate
in

a

family"

public

means

an unemancipated child

official's

or

public

employee's

household, a spouse or significant other living at the same
residence of a public

official or public

employee,

or an

individual claimed by the public official or public employee,
or the public official's or public employee's spouse as a
dependent for tax purposes.
(13) "Informal representation" means a contact, including
a request for information, whether in person, by mail, or by
telephone,

made with a state or local agency official or

employee on behalf of a client or constituent.
(14) "Judge" means an official who presides over a state,
county, or municipal court or an administrative law hearings
officer.
(15)(a)

"Local

government office,

entity"

department,

means

a

division,

local

or

regional

bureau, board,

or

commission.
(b) The term does not include a court.
(16) "Negotiating" or "negotiate for employment" means a
communication,

directly or

indirectly,

with a prospective

employer to discuss rendering services for compensation to
that prospective employer.
(17) "Negotiation for employment" means the period that
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begins with a communication to a prospective

employer to

discuss rendering services for compensation to the prospective
employer.
(18)

"Official

responsibility"

means

the

direct

administrative or operating authority, whether intermediate or
final, and either exercisable alone or with others, and either
personally or through subordinates, to approve, disapprove, or
otherwise direct government action.
(19)

"Participation"

includes

decision,

approval,

disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, or vote.
(20)

"Particular matter" includes a judicial or other

proceeding,

application,

déterminât ion, contract,

request
claim,

for

a

ruling

controversy,

or

other

investigation,

charge, accusation, arrest, rulemaking, or legislation.
(21) "Person" means an individual, proprietorship, firm,
partnership, joint venture, joint stock company, syndicate,
business trust,

estate,

company,

corporation,

association,

club, committee, organization, or group of person acting in
concert.
(22) "Prime contractor" means a person who has entered
into a public contract.
(23)

"Prime

contractor

employee"

means

an

officer,

employee, or agent of a prime contractor.
(24)

"Public contract"

means a contractor for goods,

services, or construction let by a unit of government.
(25) "Public employee" means an individual appointed to
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a position, including a person appointed to a position created
by statute, whether compensated or not, in state [, county, or
municipal] government, including members of the judiciary.
(26)

"Public member"

means

a member

appointed

to

a

noncompensated part-time position on a board, commission, or
council.

A

public member

does

not

lose

this

status

by

receiving reimbursement of expenses or a per diem payment for
services.
(27) (a) "Public official" means an individual elected to
a

state,

district,

county,

or

municipal

office,

or

an

individual who is appointed to fill a vacancy in the office,
whether or not the individual has yet assumed the office.

The

term includes a member of the board of regents, commissioner
of higher

education,

chancellor

and vice

chancellor

or

equivalent of the state university system, and a president of
a state university.
(b) The term does not include a public member of an advisory
board, commission, or council as defined in Section 2-15-122.
(28) "Remunerable activity" means a service for which a
person receives payment in the form of a wage,

salary,

or

other goods or services.
(29) "Representation" means an appearance before a state
or local entity whether gratuitous or for compensation.
(30) "Sheltered market" has the meaning ascribed to it in
Section

2

of

Enterprise Act

the
as

federal
it

Minority

currently

and

exists

Female

and as
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amended.
(31) (a)

"State entity" means a state agency,

office,

department, division, bureau, board, commission, or council,
including the legislature.
(b)

The term does not include a court or an agency in the

judicial branch.
(31) "Subcontract" means a contract or contractual action
entered

into

by

a

prime

contractor

or

subcontractor

for

obtaining goods or services under a prime contract.
(32) "Subcontract" means:
(a) a person, other than the prime contractor, who offers
to

furnish

or furnishes

goods

or services

under

a prime

contract or a subcontract entered into in connection with the
prime contract ; and
(b) a person who offers to furnish or furnishes goods or
services

to

the

prime

contractor

or

a

higher

tier

subcontractor.
(33) "Subcontractor employee" means an officer, employee,
or agent of a subcontractor.
(34)
hundred

"Substantial value" means a monetary value of one

dollars

($100)

or

more,

if

a monetary

value

is

ascertainable, or if a monetary value is not ascertainable,
anything of more than nominal value.
(35) "Unit of state or local government" means the state
or a unit or agency of state government; a county or municipal
government or committee or an agency of county or municipal
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government; or any other entity funded by or expending tax
dollars or the proceeds of publicly guaranteed bonds.
(36)

"Unwarranted

privilege"

means

a

privilege,

treatment, or advantage not available to others on an equal
basis.
§ 3 Use of Title and Prestige of Public Office

(1) A public

official

or employee

shall not

receive

anything of value for the private benefit of the official or
employee or his or her immediate family or an organization
with which the official

is associated,

unless

the public

official or public employee can show by clear and convincing
evidence that :
(a) the thing of value was conveyed for a reason
unrelated to and not arising from the recipient's holding or
having held a public office or public position; and
(b) was unrelated to actions or matters before or
affecting the government body of which the public official's
or public employee's office or employment is a part.
(2) This provision does not apply to receipt of the
following things of value:
(a) a certificate or plaque or commemorative token
[of less than $150 value];
(b) informational promotional material; or
(c)

education material

[directly related to the

public official or public employee's government duties].
5 4 Nepotism
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(1)

A

public

official

or public

employee

shall

not

advocate or cause the :
(A) employment;
(B) appointment;
(C) promotion;
(D) transfer; or
(E) advancement;
to an office or position of the state, county, municipality,
or political subdivision], or supervise or manage a member of
the public official or public employee's household or family
member or any person related or connected by consanguinity
within

the

fourth degree

or by affinity with

the

second

degree.
(2)

A

public

participate

in

an

official
action

or

public

relating

to

employee
the

shall

not

employment

or

discipline of a member of the public official's or public
employee's household or a family member.
(3) The provisions of subsection (1) do not apply to:
(a) a sheriff in the appointment of a person as a cook or
an attendant;
(b) school district trustees if all the trustees, with
the exception of any trustee who is related to the person
being appointed and who must abstain from voting

for the

appointment, approve the appointment of a person related to a
trustee;
(c) a school district in the employment of a person as a
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substitute teacher who is not employed as a substitute teacher
for more than 30 consecutive school days; or
(d)

the renewal of an employment contract of a person who

was initially hired before the member of the board, bureau or
commission

or the

department

head

to whom he

is

related

assumed the duties of the office.
§ 5 Misuse of Office

(1) A public official or employee shall not use public
funds,

time,

personnel,

facilities,

or

equipment

for the

official or employee's private gain or that of another unless
the use is authorized by law.
(2) A public official or public employee shall not use
public funds, time, personnel,

facilities, or equipment for

political or campaign activity unless the use is:
(A) authorized by law; or
(B) properly incidental to another activity required
or authorized by law.
(3) The agency may adopt rules specifying examples of
political or campaign activity permissible or not permissible
under this section.
§ 6 Representation b y Public Officials and Public Employees

(1)

(a) A state elective official other than a legislator

shall not represent another person before a state or local
entity, except as required by statute.
(b)

A legislator or members of his firm or business shall

not represent another person before a state entity, other than
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a court.
(d) A public official shall not represent another person
before an entity of the same political subdivision which the
public official serves, except as required by statute.
(e)

A

public

official

or public

employee shall

not

represent another person before the entity the public official
or public employee serves.
(f) A public employee of a bureau chief level or higher
receiving compensation other than reimbursement or per diem
payments for the public employee's official duties shall not
represent

another

person

before

an

entity

of

the

same

political division including a court.
(g) These restrictions do not apply to the following:
(i)

Purely

ministerial

matters

do not

require

discretion on the part of the entity.
(ii) Representation by a public official or public
employee in the course of the official or employee's official
duties.
(iii)
public

Representation

employee

in

the

of

officialor

the

public official

employee's

or

personal

capacity.
(iv) Representation by
official

or

a

public

an attorney who is a public

employee before

a

court when such

representation is not otherwise prohibited by applicable codes
of attorney or judicial conduct.
(2) The restrictions set forth in this section do not
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apply if the former public official or former public employee
is :
(a) testifying under oath to facts that are within
the individual's knowledge, or as an expert witness who does
not accept compensation other than regularly provided for by
law, or rule for subpoenaed witnesses; or
(b)

an

elected

representative

of

the

federal

government, or a local government within the state, or whose
principal
government

occupation
or

a

or

local

employment
government,

is
and

with

the

the

federal

appearance,

communication, assistance, or representation is on behalf of
the government.
§ 7 Votes, Deliberations, and Discussions

(1)

A

public

official

or public

employee

shall

participate in, vote on, influence, or attempt to influence an
official decision if the public official or public employee or
a business or organization with which the public official or
public employee is associated has:
(a) a pecuniary interest in; or
(b) a reasonably foreseeable benefit from;
the matter under consideration by the governmental entity of
which the public official or public employee is a member.

A

potential benefit includes detriment to a business competitor
to the public official or public

employee or business or

organization with which the public official or public employee
is associated.
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(2)

Except as permitted

in subsection

(3) , a public

official described by this subdivision but not exempt shall
abstain from participation in the discussion and vote on the
decision.

The public official's abstention must be recorded

in the governmental entity's minutes.
(3) A public official or public employee may participate
in, vote on, or influence or attempt to influence an official
decision

if

the

only

pecuniary

interest

or

reasonably

foreseeable benefit that may accrue to the public official or
public employee

is

incidental

public employee's position,
official or public
occupation,

to the pubic official's

or

or which accrues to the public

employee as a member of a profession,

or large class,

to no greater extent than the

pecuniary interest or potential benefit could reasonably be
foreseen to accrue to all other members of the profession,
occupation, or large class.
(4) The restrictions of this section apply to a business
or

organization

with

which

a

family

member

of

a

public

official or employee is associated if the family member's
pecuniary interest or a business or organization with which a
family member

is associated

has

a

reasonably

foreseeable

benefit from a matter under consideration.
(5) No member of the legislature during his
office

may

be

associated

with

a

business

or

term of

firm which

actively lobbies the legislature or represents clients before
state agencies.
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(6)

A member of the Legislature,

may not vote on the

section of that year's general appropriation bill relating to
a particular agency or commission if the member is employed by
that agency or, an individual with whom he is associated, or
a business with which he is associated has represented any
clients before that agency or commission within one year prior
to such vote.

This subsection does not prohibit a member from

voting on other sections of the general appropriation bill or
from voting on the general appropriation bill as a whole.
§ 8

Restraints on Solicitation or Acceptance of Gifts and

Gratuities

(1)

A person shall not, directly or indirectly, give,

offer, or promise anything of value to:
(a) a public official or public employee; or
(b) a person who has been elected or selected to be
a public official or public employee; with the intent to:
(i) influence an official act ;
(ii)

influence a public

official

or public

employee, or individual who has been selected to be a public
official or public employee,

to commit, aid in committing,

collude in, or allow fraud on a state, county, or municipal
entity; or
(iii)

induce

a

public

official

or

public

employee, or individual who has been selected to be a public
official or public employee, to perform or fail to perform an
act in violation of the public official or public employee's
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lawful duty.
(2) A public official or employee, or individual who has
been elected or selected to be a public official or public
employee,
exact,

shall not,

solicit,

directly or indirectly,

seek, accept, assign,

ask,

demand,

receive, or agree to

receive anything of value for the public official or employee,
or individual who has been selected to be a public official or
public employee, or for any other person or entity, in return
for being:
(a) influenced in the performance of an official
act ;
(b) influenced to commit, aid in committing, collude
in, allow fraud, or make an opportunity for the commission of
fraud on a state, county, or municipal governmental entity; or
(c) induced to perform or fail to perform an act in
violation of the public official or public employee's official
duty.
(3) A person shall not, directly or indirectly, give,
offer, or promise to give anything of value to another person
or entity, with intent to influence testimony under oath or
affirmation in a trial or other proceeding before :
(a) a court;
(b) a committee or either house or both houses of
the legislature; or
(c) an agency, commission, or officer authorized to
hear evidence or take testimony, or with intent to influence
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a witness to fail to appear.
(4) A person shall not,
demand,

exact,

solicit,

directly or indirectly,

seek,

accept,

assign,

ask,

receive,

or

agree to receive anything of value in return for influencing
testimony under oath or affirmation

in a

trial

or other

proceeding before;
(a) a court;
(b) a committee or either house or both houses of
the legislature; or
(c) an agency, commission, or officer authorized to
hear evidence or take testimony, or with intent to influence
a witness to fail to appear.
(5) Subsections (3) and (4) do not prohibit the payment
or receipt of witness fees provided by law or the payment by
the party upon whose behalf a witness is called and receipt by
a witness of the reasonable cost of travel and subsistence at
a trial, hearing, or proceeding, or, in the case of an expert
witness

involving

reasonable

fee

for

a

technical
time

spent

or professional

opinion,

in the preparation of

a
the

opinion, and in appearing or testifying.
§ 9 Private Interests by a Public Official or Public Employee
in Public Contracts

(1)

A public official or public employee may not have an

interest in a public contract if the public official or public
employee

is

authorized

to

perform

an

official

function

relating to the contract requiring the exercise of discretion.
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(2)

A public official or public employee may not have an

interest in a public contract if the public official or public
employee or a family member of a public official or public
employee or a business or organization with which the official
is associated has a substantial financial interest.
§ 10

Actions Taken While Negotiating for Employment

A public official or public employee may not act or fail
to take action in a matter affecting a person with whom the
public

official

or

public

employee

is

negotiating

for

employment.
§ 11

Representation of Clients After Government Service

(1) A former public official or former public employee
may not represent a person in a matter before a government
entity in which the former public official or former public
employee participated personally and substantially while a
public official or public employee.
(2) A former public official or former public employee
may not represent a person in a matter which was pending under
the

former public

official

official's

responsibility

or

within

former public
one

(1)

year

employee's
before

the

termination of that responsibility for one (1) year after the
former public official's or former public employee's service
in the public position has ceased.
<3) A former public official or former public employee
may not represent a person in a matter before the government
entity which the

former public

official

or former public
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employee served for a period of one (1) year after the former
public official's or former public employee's employment has
ceased.
(4)

A

former public

official

may

not register as a

lobbyist or lobbyist's principal, other than for a government
entity, for a period of one (1) year after the latter of:
(A) the date of leaving office; or
(B) the date the term of office to which the public
official was elected expires.
§ 12 Blind Trusts

(a) A public official or public employee who has direct,
indirect, or beneficial interest in a blind trust which meets
the standards set forth below is not required to disclose the
pro rata share of interests in real property or investments,
or income deriving from such interests or investments,

if

those interests are acquired by the trustee after the trust
complies with subsection (b).
(b)

A

blind

trust

must

comply

with the

following

conditions :
(1) the trustee must be:
(a) a disinterested party other than the public
official or employee's spouse,
grandchild, brother,

child, parent,

grandparent,

sister, parent-in-law, brother-in-law,

sister-in-law, aunt, uncle, first cousin, or the spouse of any
such person;
(b) someone who is not a public official or
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public employee; and
(c)

someone who has not been appoi

public entity by the public official or public employee, or by
a public official or public employee supervised by the filer.
(2) the trustee must be given complete discretion to
manage the trust, including, but not limited to, the power to
dispose of and acquire trust assets without consulting or
notifying the filer.
(3) the trustee must be required to notify the filer of
the date

of disposition and value

at

disposition of any

original investments or interests in real property so that
information can be reported on the filer's personal financial
disclosure statement.
(4) the trustee must be prohibited from disclosing to the
filer any information concerning the replacement assets except
for information required under this subsection or the minimum
tax information which lists only the totals of taxable items
from the trust and does not describe the source of individual
items of income.
(5) a copy of the trust agreement must be filed with the
Agency

within

five

(5)

business

days

after

execution,

including:
(a) an identification of the assets placed in trust;
(b) a statement detailing the date of its creation,
and the name and address of the trustee; and
(c) a statement signed by the trustee, under penalty
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of

perjury,

stating that he

or she has not revealed

any

information to the filer, except that which is permitted under
this

section,

and

knowledge, the trust
(6)

(i) if the

that,

to

is in

the

best

of

the

trustee's

compliance with this section.

trust

is revoked while the filer is a

public official or public employee, or if the filer learns of
any replacement assets of the trust, the filer must file an
amendment to the most recent statement of personal financial
disclosure

disclosing

the

date

of

revocation

and

the

previously unreported pro rata share of the trust's interests
in real property or investments or income deriving from any
such interests in real property or investments, and disqualify
himself or herself as necessary.
(ii)
of

assets

For purposes of this section, any repl

of which the

filer

learns

shall

thereafter be

treated as though they were original assets of the trust.
S 13 Personal Financial Disclosure

(1) Exception to Reporting Requirements.
This section does not require the disclosure of financial
information concerning the following:
(a)

A

spouse

legally

separated

from the public

official or public employee.
(b) A former spouse.
(c) A gift from a family member.
(d) A campaign contribution that is permitted and
reported under [the Campaign Finance Act], if required.
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(2) Individuals Required to File.
The

following

individuals

shall

file

a

statement

of

financial interests with the agency:
(a) A public official or public employee who is an
exempt employee or classified grade 18 or higher.
(b)

An

individual

nominated

to become

a public

official or public employee.
(c) An individual who is a candidate to become a
public official.
(d) A public member.
(e) A consultant.
(3) Deadline for Filing Statements
The statement of financial interest must be filed for the
preceding year no later than April 30 of each year, complete
through December 31 of the preceding year, except;
(a) In the case of an individual nominated to be a public
official, public member, or public employee, no later than 21
(twenty-one) days after the nomination.
(b)

In

the

case

of

a

candidate

to become

a public

official, at the time of filing for public office.
(c)

In the case of a public employee employed after

January 1, the later of April 30 or 21 days after employment.
(4) Filing Entity for Consultant Statements
A consultant shall file a statement of economic interests
no later than twenty-one
contractual

relationship

(21)
with

days after entering into a
the

state

or

a
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subdivision if the consultant, or member of the household of
the consultant has an economic interest in an entity:
(a) whose bid was evaluated by the consultant and who was
subsequently

awarded

the

contract

by

the

state

or

the

political subdivision that contracted with the consultant; or
(b) who was awarded a contract by the consultant.
(5) Amounts to be Reported.
(a)

Where an amount is reported,

a filer must report

information in the following category amounts unless otherwise
indicated:
(i) $1,000 - $9,999
(ii) $10,000 - $24,999
(iii) $25,000 - $49,999
(iv) $50,000 - $99,999
(v) $100,000 - $149,000
(vi) $150,000 - $249,000
(vii) $250,000 - $499,000
(viii) $500,000 - $999,999
(ix) $1,000,000 and above
§ 14

Agency Handling Disclosure of Statements

(1) The Agency may grant a reasonable extension of time
for filing a statement of financial interests.

The extension

may not exceed thirty (30) days, except in cases of illness or
incapacitation.
(2) A statement of financial interests becomes a public
record available for copying when received by the Agency.
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statement may be reviewed and copied at the office of the
Agency during ordinary business hours.
(3)

A statement of financial interests must be retained

by the Agency for a period of five (5) years after filing in
a form, including microfilming, that will facilitate document
retention, except that:
(a) Upon the expiration of three (3) years after an
individual ceases to be a public official, the Agency shall,
unless the former public official otherwise requests, destroy
any

statements

of

financial

interests

or

copies

of

such

statements filed by the former public official and any copies
in the possession of the Agency.
(b) Upon the expiration of three years after any
election at which a candidate for election as a pubic official
was not elected, or a nominee for a public office or public
employee is not confirmed in the position, the Agency shall
destroy any statements of financial interests or copies of
such statements filed by him or her as a candidate,
(i) unless the individual is otherwise required
to file a statement; or
(ii) unless the individual otherwise requests.
§ 15 Information Required

(1) A Statement of financial interests must contain full
and complete information concerning the following:
(a)

The name, business or governmental address,

work place telephone number of the filer.
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(b) The source, type, and amount or value of income
received from a governmental

entity by the filer and the

filer's spouse and dependents.
(c) The source, type, and amount of income in cash
or in-kind received by the filer and the filer's spouse, and
dependents.
(d) The source, payee, type, date, and exact amount
of gifts, including food, lodging, or entertainment:
(i) received by a filer and a filer's spouse
and dependents ; and
(ii) in excess of five hundred dollars ($500)
in a calendar year.
(e) The source, payee, type, date, and exact amount
of anything of value received from a lobbyist,
principal,

including a notation of the word

lobbyist's

"lobbyist"

to

identify gifts received by the filer, or filer's spouse and
dependents from a person engaged in lobbying activities or any
lobbyist organization.
(f) (i) The description (commercial, residential, or
rural), value, and location of all real property owned during
the calendar year by a public official, public employee, or
consultant, and the official's or employee's immediate family
members, and the same information for options to purchase such
real property;
(ii)

the amount received from the sale, lease

rental of real property; the name of the person that payment
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was received from; and
(iii)

an identification of all commercial tena

lobbyists, and lobbyist's principals (but not individuals who
are not lobbyists or lobbyist's principals) from which income
of

[$1,000 or more]

including rent or purchase money was

derived during the reporting period.
If the sale,

lease,

or rental of real property involves a

state, county, or municipal instrumentality of government, a
copy

of the contract,

lease,

or rental

agreement must be

attached to the statement of financial interests.
(g)
received

The description,
from

location,

the sale,

and

amount of payment

lease,or rental of personal property

during the preceding calendar year by a public official, or
public employee, and the official's or employee's immediate
family members, and an identification of all lobbyists and
lobbyist's principals from which income of $250 or more was
derived during the reporting period.
If the sale, lease, or rental of personal property involves a
state, county, or municipal instrumentality of government, a
copy

of the contract,

lease,

or rental agreement must be

attached to the statement of financial interests.
(h) The identity of every business or entity in which the
public official or public employee, or a family member of the
public official or public employee held securities valued at
$1,000 or more during the reporting period.
(i) A listing by name and address of:
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(i)

each

creditor

to whom the public

official,

public employee, or consultant, and the official or employee
or consultant's immediate family members owed a debt in excess
of five hundred dollars ($500) at any time during the calendar
year,

other than for a credit card or retail installment

contract,

and the original amount of the debt and amount

outstanding; and
(ii)

the

rate

of

interest

charged

the

public

official, public employee, or consultant, and the official or
employee or consultant's immediate family members.
If a discharge of the debt has been made,

the date of the

transaction must be shown.
(j) The amount and listing by name and address of all
clients represented by the public official, public employee,
or consultant,

and the official's or employee's

immediate

family members before a state, county, or municipal regulatory
Agency for a fee,

reward,

gift,

or other compensation in

excess of $250 during the preceding calendar year.
(k)

Every

officership,

directorship,

trusteeship,

or

other fiduciary relationship held in a business during the
disclosure

period,

the

term

of

office,

and

the

annual

compensation
(1)

The amount and identity of every creditor interest in

an insolvent business held during the disclosure period having
a value of five hundred dollars ($500) or more.
(m) The amount of every loan made to someone by the
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public official or public employee and their immediate family
members in an amount of five hundred dollars ($500) or more,
the original amount of the loan and amount outstanding, rate
of interest, payment schedule, and the name and address of the
person to whom the loan was made.
(n) State professional or occupation permits or licenses
held.
(0) The name of a lobbyist who is:
(i)

an

immediate

family

member

of

the

public

official or employee;
(ii) a partner of the public official or employee or
of an immediate family member;
(iii) an officer or director of the public official
or public

employee's

employer,

or employer of the public

official or public employee or an immediate family member; or
(iv) a business associate of a public official or
public employee or member of the public official's or public
employee's immediate family.
(2)

The information shall be filed on a form prescribed

by the Agency.
S 16 Technical Violations of Disclosure Requirement

(1) The Agency may , in its discretion, determine that
errors or omissions on statement of economic interests are
inadvertent and unintentional and not an effort to violate a
requirement
violations

of
not

this

act

subject

and may be handled as

technical

to

this

the

provisions

of
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pertaining to violations.

Technical violations must remain

confidential unless requested to be made public by the person
filing the statement.

In lieu of all other penalties the

agency my assess a technical violations penalty not exceeding
fifty dollars.
§ 17 Establishment and Composition of the Agency

(1)

The

Agency

is

established

as

an

independent

(2) The Agency consists of five (5) members.

The members

authority.

are appointed in the same manner as proscribed in Section 5-1102.

A member of the Agency must be a citizen of the United

States and resident of this state.

A member of the Agency

shall not be a:
(A) pubic official;
(B) public employee; or
(C) candidate;
(D) lobbyist or lobbyist's principal;
or a member of the immediate family of such an individual
while a member of the Agency.
(3) A member of the Agency serves a term of four
years.

(4)

However, the initial members of the Agency serve the

following terms:
(A)

One (1) member serves a term of one

(1) year.

(B)

One (1) member serves a term of two

(2) years.

(C)

One (1) member serves a term of three (3) years.

(D)

Two (2) members serve a term of four
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(4)

An

individual

may

not

serve

more

consecutive term as a member of the Agency.

than

two

(2)

A member of the

Agency continues in office until a successor is appointed and
has qualified.
(5)

(a) In the event a reappointment or vacancy occurs

on the agency, the appointing authority of the seat needing an
appointment shall designate a successor.
(b)

In the event the appointing authority at the time a

vacancy occurs is of the opposite political party than that of
the appointing authority that made the appointment that is
vacant, the majority or minority leader in the same house of
the same political party as the appointing authority that made
the original appointment of the commissioner whose position is
vacated shall designate the successor.
§ 2 Election and Duties of the Chair and Vice Chair
The chair and vice chair of the Agency are elected by a
majority of the members of the Agency.
chair serve a term of one

The chair and vice

(1) year, and may be re-elected.

The chair presides at meetings of the Agency.

The vice chair

presides in the absence or disability of the chair.
§ 18 Agency Meetings

The Agency meets at the call of the chair or a majority
of its members.
members.

A quorum consists of three

(3)

or more

An affirmative vote of three (3) or more members is

necessary for an Agency action.
§ 19 Filling of a Vacancy
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A vacancy is filled for the remainder of an unexpired
term in the same manners as an original appointment, except
that the chief justice of the
shall

nominate

two

(2)

[state court of last resort]

individuals

for

gubernatorial

appointment to a vacancy.
§ 2 0 Removal of a Member

(1)

The governor may remove or suspend a member of the

Agency upon filing with the Agency a written finding of the
member's misfeasance or malfeasance, and upon serving a copy
of the written finding on the member removed or suspended.
(2)

The

immediately

removal

to

the

or

first

suspension
district

may

court

be
and

appealed
may

take

precedence over all other matters pending before the court.
§ 21 Expenses for Agency Members

(1)

A member of the Agency serves without compensation,

but is afforded actual and necessary expenses incurred in the
performance of duties.
§ 22 Agency Staff

(1) The Agency may employ and remove at its pleasure an
executive director to perform its functions.

The executive

director

employing and

shall

have

the

responsibility

for

removing other personnel as may be necessary.
(2) An executive director shall administer the daily
business of the Agency, and perform the duties assigned by the
Agency.
(3)

The

Agency

shall

fix

the

compensation
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employees.

The

staff

of

the

Agency

statewide classification pay schedule.

is

outside

of

the

A member of the staff

of the Agency shall not be:
(A) a public official; or
(B) a candidate;
while a member of the staff of the Agency.
§500.08 Filing of Statement of Financial Disclosure
A member and an employee of the Agency shall

file a

statement of financial disclosure with the Agency which shall
be a public record.
§ 23 Prohibition on Political Activity b y Agency Members and
Staff

(1) A member of

the Agency and its

staff

shall not

participate in political management or in a political caimpaign
during the member or employee's term of office or employment.
A member of the Agency and its staff shall not:
(a) make a financial contribution to a candidate;
(b) make a financial contribution to a political
committee; or
(c)

knowingly attend a

fundraiser held

for

the

benefit of a candidate or political committee.
S 24 Prohibition on Lobbying Activity by Agency Members and
Staff

(1)

A member of the Agency and its staff may not be a

registered lobbyist or participate in lobbying activities that
would require the individual to register as a lobbyist, unless
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the lobbyist activities are:
(a) authorized by the Agency;
(b) conducted on behalf of the Agency; and
(c) permitted under state law.
S 25 Agency Authority and General Powers

(1)
is

Except as expressly provided otherwise, the Agency

responsible

chapter.

for

administering

the

provisions

of

this

The Agency shall have the power and duties set forth

in this Act.
§ 26 Advisory Opinions

(1)

The agency may render advisory opinions concerning

this Act based upon real or hypothetical circumstances, when
requested in writing by:
(a) a public official or public employee;
(b)

a

former

public

official

or

former

public

employee; or
(c) a person who is personally and directly involved
in the matter.
(2) An advisory opinion request by a public official or
public employee concerning his or her own affairs
affairs

of

potential

a

subordinate

public

official

public
or

official

public

or the

or employee

employee

shall

or
be

confidential.
(3)

An

advisory

opinion

request

by

a

former public

official or former public employee concerning his or her own
affairs shall be confidential.
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(4) An advisory opinion request by a person concerning
his or her own affairs with regard to potential public service
shall be confidential.
(5) An advisory opinion shall be in writing and must be
made available to the public, but in the case of confidential
advisory opinion, the identity of the person requesting the
opinion and of a person whose affairs are involved in the
circumstances

described

in

the

request

for

the

advisory

opinion, are confidential.
(6) An advisory opinion shall be deemed rendered when
signed by three or more Agency members subscribing to the
advisory opinion.
(7) An Agency member who agrees with the advisory opinion
but for different reasons than as stated may file a written
concurring opinion.
(8) An Agency member who disagrees with the advisory
opinion may file a written dissenting opinion, which will be
placed at the end of the majority opinion, or at the end of a
concurring opinion, if any.
(9) Agency attorneys may issue advice either orally or in
writing concerning this Act based upon real or hypothetical
circumstances when requested when such advice is consistent
with this Act or previous advisory opinions issued by the
Agency, provided that such advice shall be confidential when
an advisory opinion on the matter would be

confidential.

Advice

not

so

issued

by

Agency

attorneys

need
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available to the public.
(10) An advisory opinion requested under this section and
any related internal Agency materials requested or prepared as
a

result

of

such

an

advisory

opinion

request

shall

be

confidential.
(11) The confidentiality of an advisory opinion may be
waived either:
(A)

in writing,

by the person who requested the

advisory opinion; or
(B) by majority vote of the members of the Agency,
if a person makes or purports to make public the substance or
any portion of an advisory opinion requested by or on behalf
of the person.
make

public

The Agency, may in such an event, also vote to
the

advisory

opinion

request

and

related

materials.
§ 27 Conduct of Investigations

(1) The Commissioner of Campaign Practices may conduct
investigations, inquiries, and hearings concerning any matter
covered by this Act and certify its own acts and records.
(2) The Commissioner may determine whether to:
(A) investigate; and
(B) act upon a complaint.
(3)

When the Commissioner determines that assistance is

needed in conducting investigations, or when required by law,
the

Commissioner

shall

request

the

assistance

appropriate agencies.
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S 28 Adoption of Rules

The Agency shall adopt, amend, repeal, and enforce rules
to implement this Act.
§ 29 Prescription of Forms and Preservation of Documents

The Agency shall prescribe and provide forms for reports,
statements, notices, and other documents required by this Act.
Documents filed with the Agency as public records must be
retained for at least four (4) years from the date of their
receipt.
S 3 0 Review of Statements

(1) The Commissioner of Campaign Practices shall:
(a) review each statement filed in accordance with
this Act for compliance with its provisions ; and
(b)

notify

the

individual

on

whose

behalf

the

statement is filed of an omission or deficiency.
§ 31 Access to Statements

(1)

The Commissioner of Campaign Practices shall make

statements and reports filed with the Agency available upon
the written request of an individual for public inspection and
copying during regular office hours.

The Agency shall make

copying facilities available free of charge or at a cost not
to exceed actual cost.

A statement may be requested by mail,

and the Agency shall mail a copy of the requested statement to
the individual making the request upon payment of appropriate
postage costs§502.08 Maintenance of Statements
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(2)

The Agency shall compile and maintain an index of

reports and statements filed with the Agency to facilitate
public access to the reports and statements.
§ 32 Access to Information for Investigations

(1) The Commissioner may require the cooperation of a
state agency, official,

employee,

conduct is regulated by this Act.

and

other person whose

An individual shall make

information reasonably related to an investigation available
to the Agency on written request.
§ 33 Annual Report of the Agency

No later than January l of each year, the Agency shall
report to the legislature and the governor on the Agency's
activities in the preceding year.

The report must contain the

names and duties of each individual employed by the Agency,
and a summary of Agency determinations and advisory opinions.
The Agency shall prevent disclosure of the identity of a
person

involved

opinions.
within

in

[decisions

or]

confidential

advisory

The report may contain other information oh matters

the Agency's

jurisdiction

and

recommendations

for

legislation as the Agency deems desirable.
S 34 Publication of Information

(1) The Agency shall publish and make available to the
persons

subject

to

this

Act

and

the

public

explanatory

information concerning this Act, the duties imposed by it, and
the means for enforcing it.
§ 35 Research and Education Outreach
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(1)

The Agency may:
(a) conduct research concerning state governmental

ethics; and
(b) implement the educational programs it considers
necessary to effectuate this Act.
§ 36

Oaths and Subpoenas

(1) The Agency May:
(a) administer oaths and affirmations for testimony
of witnesses; and
(b)

issue subpoenas by a vote of three or more

members, subject to judicial enforcement, for the procurement
of

witnesses

and materials

relevant

to

the Commissioners

investigations, including books, papers, records, documents,
or other tangible objects.
§ 37 Local Rules

(1)

The

Agency

shall

issue

rules

governing

state

government campaign finance, conflicts of interest, financial
disclosure, and lobbyist regulation.

The rules may be adopted

by a local jurisdiction or imposed upon a local jurisdiction
under this Act.
§

38 Other Duties

(1)

The Agency may perform the other acts, duties, and

functions authorized by this Act that it deems appropriate in
connection with this Act.
§ 39 Complaints

(1)

The Commissioner shall accept from an individual.
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either

personally

or

on

behalf

of

an

organization

or

governmental body, a verified complaint in writing that states
the name of a person alleged to have committed a violation of
this Act, and sets forth the particulars of the violation.
(2)

The

Commissioner

shall

forward

a

copy

of

the

complaint and a general statement of the applicable law with
respect to the complaint to the respondent.
(3) If the Commissioner determines that the complaint
does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a violation of
the

Act,

it

complainant

shall
and

dismiss

the

the

complaint

respondent.

If

determines that the complaint alleges

and
the

notify

the

Commissioner

facts sufficient to

constitute a violation of the Act, an investigation may be
conducted with respect to an alleged violation.
(4) If the Commissioner determines that information he
has received:
(a) provides an adequate basis for the belief that
a violation of the Act has been committed; or
(b) that an investigation of a possible violation is
warranted;
an investigation may be conducted with respect to an alleged
violation.
(5)

If

investigation,

the
or

Commissioner,
upon

the

during

receipt

of

the

course

information

of

an

finds

probable cause to believe that a violation of the Act has
occurred,

it may, upon its own motion, make a complaint in
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writing, stating the name of the person who is alleged to have
committed

the

violation

of

the

Act,

and

set

forth

the

particulars thereof. A complaint initiated by the Agency must
be signed by a majority of the members of the Agency.
(6)

The Agency shall forward a copy of the complaint, and

a general statement of the applicable laws with respect to the
complaint to the respondent.
§ 40 Amendment of Conqplaints

(1) If a verified complaint has been filed, or if the
Commissioner has issued its own complaint, and subsequently
the Agency finds probable cause to believe that a violation of
the Act has occurred, other than an alleged violation in the
complaint, the Commissioner may amend the complaint upon his
own motion to include the violation.
(2) An amended complaint issued by the Commissioner must
be

signed by a majority

of the members

of Agency.

The

Commissioner shall forward a copy of the amended complaint,
and a general statement of the applicable laws with respect to
the amended complaint to the complainant and respondent.
S 41 Right to Appear

(1)

The Agency shall afford a public official or employee

who is subject of a complaint an opportunity at a preliminary
hearing to explain the conduct alleged to be in violation of
the Act.

A public official or employee who is the subject of

a complaint has the right to appear and be heard under oath
and to offer information which may tend to exonerate the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

103

public official or employee of probable cause to believe that
there has been a violation of the Act.
(2)

Unless requested otherwise by the respondent this

hearing shall not be open to the public.
§ 42

Right to Request an Investigation of One's Own Conduct

(1)

A

public

official

or

employee

may

request

the

Commissioner of Campaign Practices to make an investigation of
the

public

allegations

official's
made

by

or

employee's

another

official or employee's

own

individual

conduct.

as

conduct,
to

the

or

of

public

This request must be in

writing and set forth in detail the reasons for requesting an
investigation.
§ 43

Statute of limitations

(1)

Action may not be taken on a complaint filed more

than three (3) years after the violation of the Act is alleged
to have occurred.
(2)

Nothing herein shall bar proceedings against a

person who by fraud or other device prevents discovery of a
violation of the act.
§ 44

Referral of Evidence of a Violation of Law

(1)

Notwithstanding of the provisions of confidentiality

of investigations, the Commissioner may, in his discretion,
turn over to an appropriate government agency upon request or
as a matter of course, apparent evidence of a violation of
law.
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S 45

Authorization to Conduct an Investigation

(1)

Before the Commissioner may subpoena a witness,

administer oaths, take testimony, or require the production
for

examination

of

books

or

papers

with

respect

to

an

investigation or hearing he shall fill a notice of a complaint
with the agency which shall define the nature and scope of his
inquiry.
(2)

The agency may quash or limit the scope of the

investigation after a proceeding specified in Section 32 upon
a showing that there exists no basis for a complaint and that
the matter is frivolous.
(3)

At

Commissioner

the

conclusion

determines

of

through

the
the

investigation

if the

investigation

that

probable cause exists to believe that a violation of the act
has occurred then he shall issue a notice to appear before the
agency, setting forth;
(a)

Finding

of

facts

and

conclusions

of

law

that

demonstrate probable cause exists to believe that a violation
of the act has occurred.
(b)

The date, time, and place the hearing before the

Agency will take place pursuant to the provisions in MAPA.
(c)

The possible penalties or sanctions that may be

imposed against the respondent in the event the Agency finds
a violation of the Act occurred.
(4)

In the event the Commissioner determines that no

probable cause exists to prosecute the respondent then he
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shall

file a written notice of no probable cause and his

finding and conclusions with the agency.
(5)

If the Commissioner finds probable cause to believe

that a violation of the act has occurred the Commissioner may
waive further proceedings because of action the respondent
takes to remedy or correct the alleged violation which may
including

the

payment

of

fines

or

acceptance

of

other

sanctions. The Agency must issue an order which approves the
remedial or corrective action taken by the respondent,

the

Commissioners decision in light of the action to waive further
proceedings,

and the Commissioner's

justification for his

decision which will then become part of the public record.
(a)

If the Agency refused to approve the settlement of

the matter then the Commissioner shall

issue a notice of

hearing pursuant to subsection (3).
(6)

The Commissioner at the end of his investigation may

initiate an action against a complainant if the allegations
made by the complainant prove to be frivolous, or groundless
and are made recklessly or maliciously.

Proceedings under

such action shall be made in accordance with section 37 the
agency could order the complainant to pay civil penalties up
to $1,000 plus pay to the respondent an amount equal to the
expenses incurred by the respondent for attorney fees and
other expenses related to the investigation of the complaint.
§ 46

Hearing procedures

(1)

The agency shall conduct a hearing pursuant to the
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provisions of MAPA with the exception that if a hearings
examiner is appointed he must :
(a) be a licensed attorney in the state of Montana;
(b) not be an elective official or full-time employee of
the executive or legislative branch; and
(c)

not

be

a member

or

employee

of

the

Agency

or

Commissioner.
(2)

The Commissioner or his designee shall prosecute the

case before the agency.
(3)

The respondent shall have the full rights granted

under the adverse hearing proceeding specified in MAPA.
(4)

After the conclusion of its hearing,

the Agency

shall, as soon as practicable;
(a) begin deliberations on the evidence presented at the
hearing; and
(b) determine whether the respondent has violated the
act.
(5)

If a hearing officer is appointed and a majority of

the members of the Agency are not present at the hearing the
Agency shall not begin deliberations until after:
(a)

the

proposed

decision

prepared

by

the

hearings

officer is served upon the Agency and the parties; and
(b) an opportunity is provided for oral arguments.
§ 47

Orders and Recommendations

(1)

No later than 12 0 days after the conclusion of a

hearing to determine whether a violation

of the act has
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occurred, the Agency shall set forth its determination in a
written decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The Agency shall sent its written decision with findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the respondent and complainant
and Commissioner.
(2)

If the Agency determines that a violation of the Act

has occurred, its written decision with findings of fact and
conclusions

of

law must

contain

one

(1)

or more

of

the

following orders or recommendations:
(A)

In the

case

of a state

official

liable

to

impeachment, a recommendation to the presiding officer of each
chamber of the legislature that the official be removed from
office.
(B)
employee

in

In the case of a public official
the

[classified

or

unclassified]

or public
service,

a

recommendation to the appropriate appointing authority that
the public official or public employee be censured, suspended,
or removed from office or employment.
(C)

In

the

case

of

a

member

of

the

state

legislature, a recommendation to the presiding officer of the
appropriate chamber of the legislature that the legislator be
censured, suspended, or removed from office.
(D) In the case of a judge, a recommendation to the
[state court of last resort] and to the presiding officer of
each chamber of the legislature that the judge be censured,
suspended, or removed from office-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

108

(E) An order requiring the public official or public
employee to conform the official's or employee's conduct to
the requirements of the Act.
(F) An order requiring the public official or public
employee to pay a civil penalty of not more than [$2,000] for
each violation
requested

by

of

the

the

Act.

Agency,

The

shall

attorney

institute

general,

when

proceedings

to

recover a fine or forfeiture incurred under this section not
paid by,

or on behalf

of,

the person against whom it is

assessed.
(G) Other recommendations or orders, including:
(i) forfeiture of gifts, receipts or profits
obtained through a violation of the Act;
(ii) voiding of a state action obtained through
a violation of the Act; or
(iii)

or

a

combination

of

the

above,

as

necessary and appropriate, consistent with the Act.
(3) A fine imposed by the Agency,

disciplinary action

taken by an appropriate authority, or a determination not to
take disciplinary action made by an appropriate authority is
public record.
(4) This section does not limit the power of:
(A) either chamber of the legislature to discipline
its own members or to impeach a public official; or
(B) of a department to discipline its official or
employees.
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§ 48 Action by the Attorney General

(1) The attorney general may recover a fee, compensation,
gift,

or profit

received by

a person

as

a

result

of

a

violation of the Act.
(2) Action taken by the attorney general under this
subsection must be brought no later than one (1) year after a
determination of a violation of the Act
§ 49 Public Inspection of Records

(1)

Except as provided

in subsection

(2)

below,

all

Agency records are open for public inspection during normal
business hours.
(2)

The

following

records

are

not

open

for

public

inspection:
(A) Records obtained in connection with a request
for

an

advisory

opinion.

The

Agency

may

make

records

described by this subdivision public with the consent of the
individual whom the records pertain.
(B) Records obtained or prepared by the Agency in
connection with an investigation or complaint.

However, the

Agency shall permit inspection of the following:
(i) Records made public in the course of a
hearing.
(ii) Verified complaints filed with the Agency.
(iii) Complaints issued by the Agency.
(iv) Probable cause decision with findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
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(v)

Decisions

with

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law issued after a hearing.
(vi)

A

determination

made

by

the

Agency

regarding a rehearing.
(vii) A settlement entered into by the Agency
and a respondent.
(3) A person who makes or purports to make public the
substance or a portion of a confidential advisory opinion
requested by

or

on behalf

of

the person

has

waived

the

confidentiality of the request for an advisory opinion, and of
a record obtained by the Agency in connection with the request
for an advisory opinion.
(4) The agency may publicly respond to a statement or
interpretation made concerning the contents of an advisory
opinion or decision it has issued or its purported to have
issued.
§ 50 Forfeiture of Pension and Retirement Benefits

(1) A public official or public employee, or a survivor,
heir,

successor,

or estate of a public official or public

employee who is convicted of a felony:
(A) relating to; or
(B) arising out of ;
the public official or public employee's public service may
not receive the portion of pension or retirement benefits paid
by a public entity and interest accrued on that portion.
(2)

A public official

or public

employee
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public service subsequent to the passage of this Act is deemed
to have consented to this section as a condition of coverage.
§ 51 Tax Treatment of Fines and Repayments

(1) A fine,

penalty,

reimbursement,

or other payment

ordered by the Agency or court in connection with making the
government whole for a transaction improperly entered into by
a public official, employee or consultant, or a member of the
immediate

household

of

a

public

official,

employee,

or

consultant does not qualify for a state or local tax credit or
deduction.
(2)

The guilt

subsection

or

innocence

of

a party making under

(1) has no effect upon the state or local tax

consequences, nor does an admission or failure to admit guilt
or complicity in a transaction.
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